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ABSTRACT
We examine the long-run consequences of the scramble for Africa among European powers in the
late 19th century and uncover the following empirical regularities. First, utilizing information on the
spatial distribution of African ethnicities before colonization, we show that borders were artificially
drawn. Apart from the land mass and water area of an ethnicity’s historical homeland, no other geographic,
economic, and historical trait predicts partitioning by the national borders. Second, we exploit a detailed
geo-referenced database on various types of conflict across African regions and show that civil conflict
is concentrated in the historical homeland of partitioned ethnicities. We further document that violence
against civilians and territorial changes between rebel groups, militias, and government forces are
systematically higher in the homelands of split groups. These results are robust to a rich set of local
controls, the inclusion of country fixed effects, and alternative data sources. The uncovered evidence
















The predominant explanations on the deep roots of contemporary African underdevelopment
are centered around the inﬂuence of Europeans during the colonial period (Acemoglu et al.
(2001, 2002, 2005)), but also in the centuries before colonization when close to 20 million slaves
were exported from Africa (Nunn (2008), Nunn and Wantchekon (2011)). Yet in the period
between the ending of the slave trades and the colonial rule, another major event took place
in European capitals that according to the African historiography had malicious long-lasting
consequences. The "Scramble for Africa" starts with the Berlin Conference of 1884 − 1885
and is completed by the turn of the 20th century. In this brief period, Europeans partitioned
Africa into spheres of inﬂuence, protectorates, colonies, and free-trade areas. The borders were
designed in European capitals at a time when Europeans had barely settled in Africa and had
little knowledge of local conditions. Despite their arbitrariness these boundaries endured after
African independence in the 1960s. As a result in many African countries a signiﬁcant fraction
of the population belongs to ethnic groups that have been partitioned by the national border.1
A considerable body of work in African historiography (e.g. Asiwaju (1985); Dowden (2008);
Wesseling (1996); Herbst (2000)) argues that the main channel of Europeans’ inﬂuence on
African development was not colonization per se, but the improper border design. Partitioning,
the argument goes, has led to ethnic struggles, patronage politics, and conﬂict. Yet there is
little work that formally examines the impact of ethnic partitioning.2
This study is a ﬁrst step to empirically assess the long-run eﬀects of the scramble for
Africa. While there is little disagreement among historians that colonial borders were arbitrarily
drawn, we start our analysis establishing formally their artiﬁciality. With the sole exceptions
of the size of the historical homeland and area under water, we are unable to detect any
other signiﬁcant diﬀerences between partitioned and non-partitioned ethnicities with respect
to geography (elevation, distance to the coast, soil quality), the disease environment (malaria),
natural resources (diamond mines and oil ﬁelds), and measures of early contact with colonizers.
We further show that there are no systematic diﬀerences between split and non-split groups,
across several pre-colonial ethnic-speciﬁc institutional, cultural, and economic features, such as
the size of settlements, the type of the subsistence economy, etc. (Murdock (1967)).
We then employ the scramble for Africa as a quasi-natural experiment and assess the
1Asiwaju (1985) identiﬁes 177 partitioned ethnic groups that span all African borders. Englebert, Tarango,
and Carter (2002) estimates that partitioned ethnic groups constitute on average 40% of the total population.
Alesina, Easterly, and Matuszeski (2011) estimate that in several African countries the percentage of the pop-
ulation that belongs to a partitioned group exceeds 80% (e.g. Guinea-Bissau (80%); Guinea (88.4%); Eritrea
(83%); Burundi (97.4%); Malawi (89%); Senegal (91%); Rwanda (100%); Zimbabwe (99%)).
2The cross-country studies of Alesina, Easterly, and Matuszeski (2011) and Englebert, Tarango, and Carter
(2002) do touch upon this issue. We discuss the relationship of our work with these studies below.
1impact of ethnic partitioning on regional civil conﬂict. Using a new rich dataset that reports
detailed geo-referenced information for 1997−2010 on the exact location of more than 43,000
incidents of political violence including battles between government forces, rebel groups and
militias, changes of territorial control, as well as violence against civilians (the latter includes
murders, abductions, child soldiering raids, rapes, mutilations), we show that civil conﬂict is
concentrated in the historical homeland of partitioned ethnicities. Our regional focus allows
us to explore within-country variation, accounting for the numerous country-wide factors that
interact with civil conﬂict. Moreover, we obtain similar results when we restrict estimation
to ethnic areas close to national borders. Our most conservative estimates suggest that civil
conﬂict intensity is approximately 50% higher in areas where partitioned ethnicities reside as
compared to the homelands of ethnic groups that have not been separated by the national
borders. We further ﬁnd that homelands of partitioned groups experience a 5% to 10% higher
likelihood of a territorial control change between the government and rebel groups. It is not only
army ﬁghting that is concentrated in the homelands of partitioned groups. Violence against
civilians is also roughly 40% higher where split groups reside. The evidence thus uncovers the
ongoing violent repercussions of the colonial border design.
Historical Background
The "Scramble for Africa" starts in 1860s - 1870s when the French and the British begin the
systematic exploration of Western Africa and sign bilateral agreements assigning to each other
spheres of inﬂuence. In the next 30 years, European powers signed hundreds of treaties that
partitioned the largely unexplored continent into protectorates, free-trade areas, and colonies.
The event that stands for the partitioning of Africa is the conference that Otto von Bismarck
organized in Berlin from November 1884 till February 1885. While the Berlin conference
discussed only the boundaries of Central Africa (the Congo Free State), it came to symbolize
the partitioning, because it laid down the principles that would be used among Europeans
to divide the continent.3 The key consideration was to preserve the "status quo" preventing
conﬂict among Europeans for Africa (as the memories of the European wars of the 18th-19th
century were still alive). As a result, European powers drew borders without taking into
account local conditions and the ethnic composition. African leaders were not invited and had
3Three major principles emerged from the Berlin Conference. First, the hinterland doctrine, according to
which a power claiming the coast had also a right to its interior. Yet, the applicability of this principle became
problematic, as it was not clear what exactly constitutes the hinterland. For example, at some point France
demanded Nigeria claiming that it was the hinterland of Algeria. Second, the principle of eﬀective possession
required that Europeans had to base their claim on treaties with local tribal leaders. Yet, it was hard to assign
zones of inﬂuence based on such treaties, because as Bismarck pointed out "it was too easy to come by a piece
of paper with a lot of Negro crosses at the bottom" (Wesseling (1996)). Third, the eﬀective occupation doctrine
required that European powers exert signiﬁcant control of the territory they were claiming. Yet, with the
insistence of the British this principle was soon diminished to apply mostly to the coastline.
2no say.4 European leaders were in such a rush that they didn’t wait for the new information
arriving from explorers, geographers, and missionaries.
There is wide agreement among African historians that border design was to a great
extent arbitrary (see Asiwaju (1985) and Englebert (2009) for references). As the British
prime minister at the time Lord Salisbury put it, "we have been engaged in drawing lines upon
maps where no white man’s feet have ever tord; we have been giving away mountains and rivers
and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small impediment that we never knew exactly
where the mountains and rivers and lakes were." Asiwaju (1985) summarizes that "the study
of European archives supports the accidental rather than a conspiratorial theory of the marking
of African boundaries."5 In line with the historical evidence, Alesina, Easterly, and Matuszeski
(2011) document that eighty percent of African borders follow latitudinal and longitudinal
lines, more than in any other part of the world.
Several factors have been proposed to rationalize the arbitrary border design. First, at the
time Europeans had limited knowledge of local geographic conditions, as with the exception of
some coastal areas, the continent was largely unexplored. Second, Europeans were not drawing
borders of prospective states or -in many cases- even colonies. Third, there was a constant
imperialist back and forth with European powers swapping pieces of land with limited (at
best) idea of what they were worth of.6 Fourth, while in most cases the treaties indicated
that the exact boundaries would be set by special commissions, demarcation was poor. Fifth,
Europeans were not willing to sacriﬁce their commitment not to go to war for any part of
Africa.7 In many cases London and Paris turned down requests from local administrators to
redraw the border because it did not coincide with a physical boundary or because an ethnic
group was split. Sixth, as there was an implicit agreement between Europeans that ethnicities
could freely move across colonial borders, African leaders did not oppose the colonial design,
4Asiwaju (1985) notes that "the Berlin conference, despite its importance for the subsequent history of Africa,
was essentially a European aﬀair: there was no African representation, and African concerns were, if they
mattered at all, completely marginal to the basic economic, strategic, and political interests of the negotiating
European powers".
5Likewise, Hargreaves (1985) writes "rather than attempting to follow the boundaries of states whose rulers
might not be able to describe them accurately, the French preferred to allocate territory along some natural feature
like a watershed. Yet, the problem was that the Europeans had a rather imperfect idea of where the water streams
exactly where. A prominent example is the Anglo-German agreement on the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary that
was supposed to be Rio del Rey. The latter proved to be an estuary receiving several small streams."
6An illustrative example is the annexation of Katanga in Congo Free State that turned out to be the richest
province. King Leopold demanded and eventually got Katanga in exchange for the Niari-Kwilu area that the
French insisted of getting themselves. Wesseling (1996) writes "what impelled him [Leopold] was a general
imperialist surge, the desire for compensation for the Niari-Kwilu, and the objective of making the new state as
large as possible and ﬁlling as much of the Congo basin as possible."
7For example Wesseling (1996) writes "in later years, Katanga was to become a most desirable possession in
the eyes of British imperialists such as Cecil Rhodes and Harry Johnston. When they approached the British
government on the subject, it stuck to its guns. Anderson let them know that Leopold’s map had been recognized
in 1885 and that his territory unmistakably comprised the mining region of Katanga. What was done, was done."
3as little changed on the ground.8
The other major event in recent African history, the wave of independence, was also rapid.
The independence of Northern African countries in the 1950s was soon followed by Ghana’s and
Guinea’s independence in 1957 and in 1958, respectively. By the end of 1966, 40 countries had
gained independence. While at the time, many proposed changing the colonial borders, African
leaders and leaving Europeans did not touch the issue. The leaders of African independence
believed that nation building and industrialization would sideline ethnic divisions. Europeans’
main objective was to maintain their special rights and corporate deals with former colonies,
and as such, they were reluctant to open the border issue.9
Case Studies - Channels
The literature has put forward several explanations on how the partitioning of ethnicities
and the creation of artiﬁcial states has contributed to African underdevelopment.
First, in several instances partitioning has generated irredentist demands, as ethnicities
that are minority groups in a country want to unify with their peers across the border. For
example, Somali tribes were split between three diﬀerent European colonies, while Ethiopia also
got a slice. The ﬁve-pointed star in the ﬂag of Somalia symbolizes the ﬁve regions inhabited
by Somali tribes (Somalia, North Kenya, Southern Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Eritrea); at least
three long-lasting post-independence wars have been (partly at least) driven by the desire of
Somalis in Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya to become part of Somalia (e.g. Meredith (2005)).
In line with this, in our sample that covers the period 1997 − 2010, the bulk of battles and
violent events against civilians have taken place in the Ogaden region in Southern Ethiopia
where Somali tribes reside. Speciﬁcally, in Ethiopia (that in Murdock’s map comprises 48
ethnic homelands), 33% of a total of 961 battles between government forces, rebel groups and
militias as well as 19% of 295 violent events against civilians occurred in the Ogaden region
where the partitioned Afar and the other Somali tribes are located.
Second, partitioned ethnicities may ﬁght to gain independence or obtain autonomy. Wim-
mer, Cederman, and Min (2009) estimate that around 20% of all civil wars in Africa have a
secessionist demand. Compared to non-split groups, partitioned ethnicities can get assistance
from their peers on the other side of the border. An illustrative example is the recurring conﬂict
in the Casamance region in Southern Senegal, where the partitioned Diola (Jola) reside. As
Gambia eﬀectively splits Senegal into a Northern and a Southern part, the Casamance province
8Asiwaju (1985) cites the Ketu king, saying that "we regard the boundary (between Benin-Dahomey and
Nigeria) separating the English and the French, not the Yoruba."
9Almost all African countries accepted the colonial borders when signing the Charter of the Organization of
African Union in 1964. Only Somalia and Morocco did not accept the colonial borders. Ghana and Togo raised
also objections on their boundary that splits the Ewe.
4is disconnected from the central government in Dakar. The independence "Movement of the
Democratic Forces of Casamance" was supported by the neighboring Guinea-Bissau (and to a
lesser extent by Gambia), where the Diola exert a signiﬁcant inﬂuence.10 Our results are in line
with these arguments. In Senegal Murdock (1959) maps 12 ethnic homelands. In our sample
40% of a total of 198 battles and 40% of 140 violent events against civilians have taken place
in the homeland of the partitioned Diola.
Similarly, compared to non-split ethnicities, ethnic militias and rebel groups that support
partitioned ethnicities shelter and regroup on the other side of the border. The notorious Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA) militia, which was founded to protect the marginalized by ethnic
partitioning Acholi group oﬀers an illustration. Whenever the Uganda government forces were
defeating the LRA, the rebel group and its leader Joseph Kony were sheltering, regrouping,
and rearming in the Acholi homeland in Southern Sudan and the Central African Republic.
Nowadays, and in spite of the improving political and economic situation in Uganda, the
Acholi-land is the most conﬂict-prone region in Africa recording more than 1,500 incidents of
conﬂict.
Third, African borders are poorly delineated due to the imprecise colonial treaties. This
has resulted in many border disputes, especially when poorly demarcated borders cause the
partitioning of ethnic groups.11 This imprecision seems to have contributed to conﬂict in
Somalia (S.Samatar (1985)), whereas the ambiguity of the tripartite treaty of 1902 between
Britain, Italy and Ethiopia has also played a role in the Eritrea-Ethiopia war.
Fourth, Africa is characterized by patronage politics where dominant ethnic groups dis-
criminate against minority groups. In case of partitioned groups the neighboring country
intervenes either to support its peers or to prevent migration and refugee ﬂows. For example,
the Ewe in Togo helped Flt.-Lt. Jerry Rawlings (half Ewe) in his coup in 1979 and 1981 to
overthrow the government in Ghana. This escalated ethnic tensions between the Ewe, the
Ashanti, and the Akan, in Ghana leading to conﬂict in the subsequent years. Our data are
in line with this argument. While the civil war is long over, we still observe violence against
civilians and (relatively minor) conﬂict in the homeland of the Ewe both in Ghana and in Togo,
although overall conﬂict in both countries has been minimal in the past decade.12
10Renner (1985) writes "Senegal itself became truncated, and could only be linked by traversing Gambia or
by using the much lengthier overland route, The partition was undertaken (between the French and the British)
without any consideration for cultural ties, economic viability or regional coherence."
11Englebert, Tarango, and Carter (2002) write "of all the territorial disputes brought before the International
Court of Justice since 1960, 57% were African, while only 33% (104 out of 315) of all bilateral boundaries
worldwide are in Africa."
12The conﬂict in the Alur-land oﬀers another illustration of this type of violence. The Alur had been split
between the Belgian Congo and the British Protectorate of Uganda during the late phase of the scramble for
Africa (1910 − 1914). After independence when the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko initiated the subjugation of
many minority groups in Congo, a large portion of the Alur moved to their homeland in Uganda. This in turn
5Fifth, due to the poor institutional infrastructure and their ethnic contacts across the
border, partitioned ethnicities may engage in smuggling and other criminal activities. For
example, in his analysis of the Anglo-French partitioning of the Sultanate of the Mandara in
the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary, Barkindo (1985) writes that "the most serious problem was
the increase in crime and disputes across the border. The fact that the border divided people
of the same family and settlements made it diﬃcult to check crime and control smuggling."
Collins (1985) also provides an illustration of how smuggling allowed the Hausa to arbitrage
price caps and other distortionary policies in Niger and Nigeria. In line with these arguments
over our sample period the Hausa-land in Nigeria has experienced 111 conﬂict incidents, while
the average (median) number of conﬂict across the 112 ethnic regions is 20 (3).
Sixth, partitioning and border artiﬁciality may lead to armed warfare by interacting
with natural resources. For example, armed conﬂict in the Cabinda enclave that is separated
from the rest of Angola by a narrow strip of territory belonging to the Democratic Republic of
the Congo is driven by the interaction between the artiﬁcial border design, the vast oil ﬁelds,
and the partitioning of the Bakongo (see Caselli, Morelli, and Rohner (2012) for a theoretical
exposition and cross-country-pair evidence).
Finally, the artiﬁcial border design may have contributed to underdevelopment and civil
conﬂict via channels beyond ethnic partitioning. In particular, the colonial border drawing
shaped a host of country-speciﬁc geographical and cultural characteristics including a country’s
ethnic diversity, size, access to the sea, etc. For example, Herbst (2000) argues that civil
conﬂict is more pervasive in large African countries due to geographic inequalities that make
it harder for the state to broadcast political power and prevent secessionist movements (see
also Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2012a)). Collier and Venables (2008) observe that the
border design resulted in Africa having the largest proportion of landlocked countries limiting
their growth potential. While our analysis focuses on one aspect of the scramble for Africa,
namely the eﬀect of ethnic partitioning on civil conﬂict, we are able to account for these other
aspects of European’s inﬂuence with the inclusion of country ﬁxed eﬀects that account for all
time-invariant, country-speciﬁc characteristics.
Related Literature
Our paper contributes to two main strands of literature. First, it relates to studies that aim
to uncover the deep roots of African - and more broadly global - development. This literature
has mainly focused on the impact of colonization mainly via the formation of early institutions
(e.g. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005)) or via human capital (e.g. Glaeser, LaPorta,
generated opposition from the Buganda (the main group in Uganda) leading to civil conﬂict.
6de Silanes, and Shleifer (2004) and Easterly and Levine (2009)). In contrast to this body of
work, Gennaioli and Rainer (2006, 2007) and Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2012b) focus on
the pre-colonial period and show that deeply-rooted ethnic institutions correlate signiﬁcantly
with contemporary economic development. In the same vein Besley and Reynal-Querol (2012)
show that contemporary conﬂict correlates with pre-colonial conﬂict.13
Our study contributes to this body of research, by emphasizing a neglected aspect of
colonization; the drawing of political boundaries in the end of the 20th century that resulted in a
large number of partitioned ethnicities. As such our work is mostly related to Alesina, Easterly,
and Matuszeski (2011) who show that "artiﬁcial states" with straight borders and where a
signiﬁcant part of the population resides in more than one country, perform economically
worse compared to countries with more organic (squiggly) borders. We focus on Africa, as the
random design of colonial borders that endured after the independence allows us to identify
the causal eﬀect of partitioning.
Second, our work contributes to the literature on the origins of civil conﬂict that mainly
examines the role of country-level characteristics, such as income and natural resources (see
Collier and Hoeﬄer (2007) and Blattman and Miguel (2010) for reviews and Collier and Sam-
banis (2005) for case studies in Africa). Of most relevance to the present study are works that
link a country’s ethnic composition to civil war, Caselli and Coleman (2012). While the corre-
lation between ethnic fragmentation and civil war is weak (Fearon and Laitin (2003)), recent
studies document interesting cross-country correlations associating various aspects of the soci-
etal structure with armed conﬂict. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and Esteban, Mayoral,
and Ray (2012) show a strong negative correlation between ethnic polarization and conﬂict.
Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009) ﬁnd that the likelihood of ethnic conﬂict increases when
a large share of the population is excluded from power. Matuszeski and Schneider (2006) doc-
ument that civil warfare is much higher in countries where ethnicities are clustered in speciﬁc
areas. Englebert, Tarango, and Carter (2002) show a positive cross-country correlation between
proxy measures of suﬀocation and dismemberment and political violence, secession attempts,
border disputes, and civil warfare.
The correlations found in studies exploiting cross-country variation in border design and
the distribution of ethnicities are informative; yet they cannot be causally interpreted (see
Blattman and Miguel (2010) for a discussion). The main reason is that the process of border
13Of some relevance to our work are studies showing a signiﬁcant negative association between ethnic fragmen-
tation/polarization and development (see Alesina and Ferrara (2005) for a review). Ethnic fragmentation tends
to lower public goods provision (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999), LaPorta, de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1999)), fuel authoritarianism (Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2004)), and increase the likelihood of secession (e.g.
Alesina and Spolaore (2003)), especially when ethnicities are segregated (Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011)) or
are economically unequal (Alesina, Michalopoulos, and Papaioannou (2012)).
7drawing is historically related to the process of state formation and is thus associated with both
voluntary and forced peoples’ movements. Our study accounts for some of the shortcomings of
cross-country studies. First, it establishes that African borders are to a great degree artiﬁcial
by showing that there are no systematic diﬀerences in geographic, economic, institutional,
and cultural characteristics between partitioned and non-split ethnicities. Second, the use of
information on the spatial distribution of ethnicities in the end of 19th century, well before
the current national boundaries came into eﬀect, alleviates concerns related to migratory ﬂows
ignited by the border design. Third, we can control for country ﬁxed eﬀects as well as local
geography, the disease environment, natural resources, and other factors that a vast literature
has emphasized as key determinants of civil conﬂict and under-development.
Structure
In the next section we discuss how we identify partitioned ethnic groups and present the geo-
referenced civil conﬂict data. We give the descriptive statistics illustrating the cross-ethnicity
and within-country variation in conﬂict intensity. We also report test of means/medians that
illustrate the signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the likelihood and intensity of armed conﬂict between
partitioned and non-split groups. In Section 3 we examine whether there are systematic diﬀer-
ences between partitioned and non-partitioned ethnicities with respect to an array of geographic
and historical features. Section 4 reports our baseline estimates on the eﬀect of ethnic parti-
tioning on various aspects of civil conﬂict (number of conﬂict incidents, violence against the
civilian population, total battles as well as battles resulting in territorial changes between the
government and rebel groups). In Section 5 we report the results of our sensitivity analysis. In
Section 6 we summarize discussing possible avenues for future research.
2 Data
2.1 Identifying Partitioned Ethnic Groups
We identify partitioned groups projecting contemporary national borders, as portrayed in the
2000 Digital Chart of the World on George Peter Murdock’s Ethnolinguistic Map (1959) that
depicts the spatial distribution of African ethnicities at the time of European colonization in
the mid/late 19th century (Figure 1a).14 Murdock’s map divides Africa into 843 ethnic regions.
The mapped ethnicities correspond roughly to levels 7−8 of the Ethnologue’s language family
tree. 8 areas are "uninhabited upon colonization" and are therefore not considered in our
analysis. We also drop the Guanche, a small group in the Madeira islands that is currently
14When we intersect Murdock’s ethnolinguistic map with the 2000 Digital Chart of the World we drop resulting
partitions of less than 100 square kilometers, as such tiny partitions are most likely due to the lack of precision
in the underlying mapping of ethnicities.
8part of Portugal. Out of a total of 834 ethnicities in Murdock’s Map, the homeland of 358
groups falls into more than one contemporary country. Yet for several of these groups the
overwhelming majority of their homeland’s area (usually more than 99%) falls into a single
country. For example, 99.5% of the total area of the Ahaggaren falls into Niger and only 0.5%
falls into Algeria. Since Murdock’s map is bound to be drawn with some error, we identify as
partitioned groups those ethnicities with at least 10% of their total surface area belonging to
more than one countries (SPLIT). As such the Ahaggaren is classiﬁed as a non-split group.
There are 231 ethnic groups with at least 10% of their historical homeland falling into more
than one contemporary states (Figure 1b). Appendix Table A lists all partitioned ethnic groups.
When we use a broader threshold of 5% we identify 267 partitioned ethnicities. In our empirical
analysis we also exclude 8 regions where population according to the earliest post-independence
census is zero. Thus, in our baseline sample we have a total of 826 populated ethnic areas of
which 230 are partitioned.15
Our procedure identiﬁes most major ethnic groups that have been split by African bor-
ders. For example, the Maasai are partitioned between Kenya and Tanzania (shares 62% and
38%, respectively), the Anyi between Ghana and the Ivory Coast (shares 58% and 42%, re-
spectively), and the Chewa between Mozambique (50%), Malawi (34%), and Zimbabwe (16%).
Other examples include the Hausa (split between Nigeria and Niger), the Ababda (split between
Egypt and Sudan), and the Bararetta Somali clans (split between Kenya and Somalia). We
also checked whether our codiﬁcation of partitioned ethnicities is in line with Asiwaju (1985),
who provides the only (to our knowledge) codiﬁcation of partitioned ethnicities in Africa. Our
15When we primarily explore within-country variation, we also lose observations in countries with either
one ethnic group or without variability in partitioning, namely in Burundi, Djibouti, Swaziland, Comoros,
Madagascar, and Western Sahara.
9strategy identiﬁes almost all ethnic groups that Asiwaju (1985) lists as partitioned.16
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Figure 1a Figure 1b
We also construct a continuous index of partitioning in the spirit of the ethnic/linguistic
fragmentation indicators (e.g. Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003)).
The continuous index of partitioning reﬂects the probability that a randomly chosen pixel (area)
of the historical homeland of an ethnic group falls into a diﬀerent country. The ethnic groups
with the highest score in this index are the Malinke, which are split into six diﬀerent countries;
the Ndembu, which are split between Angola, Zaire, and Zambia; and the Nukwe, which are
split between Angola, Namibia, Zambia, and Botswana.17
2.2 Civil Conﬂict Data
The main data source for the location of armed conﬂict across African regions is the Armed
Conﬂict Location and Event Dataset Raleigh, Linke, Hegre, and Karlsen (2010). The ACLED
project provides geo-referenced data on the exact location (and some key characteristics) of po-
litically violent events across all African countries since 1997. In contrast to other geo-referenced
civil war datasets that only report the centroid and an approximate radius of the major war
16In Section 5 we report results using the Ethnologue’s mapping of linguistic groups to identify partitioned
ethnicities. The results are similar.
17We prefer the binary index of partitioning for several reasons. First, all studies in African historiography
suggest that what matters for civil conﬂict is whether an ethnicity has been partitioned or not rather than the
degree of the split. Second, there is no clear reason on why the propensity to conﬂict should monotonically
increase with the degree of partitioning. Third, as Murdock’s map certainly contains noise, this will be reﬂected
more clearly in the continuous measure (as compared to the binary index). Nevertheless, to show that our results
are not sensitive to the index of partitioning in Table 8 we report speciﬁcations with the continuous index.
10incidents, ACLED provides precise locational data of armed violence. The ACLED database is
quite rich as there are 43,271 incidents of political violence over the period 1997−2010 across
all African countries. Political violence is understood as the use of force by a group with a
political purpose or motivation. Conﬂict groups (actors) include rebels, militias, governments,
and organized political or ethnic groups that interact violently over issues of political authority,
such as territorial control, government control, access to resources, etc. ACLED categorizes
armed conﬂict into 8 types. (1) Battles without change of control; (2) Battles where rebel
groups gain control of the location; (3) Battles where the government regains control of a lo-
cation; (4) Headquarter of base establishments, where rebel groups establish (via violent or
non-violent means) their base; (5) Non-violent conﬂict events where rebel groups, militias or
government forces proceed in non-violent actions (without active ﬁghting) that are, however,
within the context of an ongoing civil conﬂict and dispute (e.g. recruitment drives, incursions
or rallies); (6) Riots and protests; (7) Violence again civilians, where armed groups (rebels,
militias or government forces) attack unarmed civilians; (8) Non-Violent transfer of control.
Our benchmark index of civil conﬂict is the count of all types of armed conﬂict. We
also examine the eﬀect of ethnic partitioning on (i) the total number of battles, (ii) battles
that resulted in a change in territorial control, and (iii) violent events against civilians. Battles
among armed forces account for 43.2% of all incidents in the ACLED database; out of a total
of 18,705 battles, 2,324 resulted in a change of territorial control. The dataset also records
information on 15,844 cases of violence against civilians (36.6% of all incidents of conﬂict); as
such we can examine the eﬀect of partitioning not only on ﬁghting among organized armed
actors, but also on violence against civilians. The latter includes incidents of rape, terrorism,
mass killings of civilian populations, kidnaps, and ﬁres.
Examples of battles between armed actors include the numerous ﬁghts between the
Acholi-based Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army, and
the Uganda’s People Defence Force (UPDF); the constant ﬁghting between the Rwandan mil-
itary forces against the FDLR (Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda) Hutu rebels
both in Rwanda and in Eastern Congo; the battles between the republican forces of Ivory
Coast and various militias either supporting Alassane Quattera or Laurent Gambo; and the
(relatively small scale) battles between Kikuyu rebel groups against Maasai militias. Battles
result usually in many casualties; for example in a single event in September 1999 the Ugandan
army killed 42 Pian warriors, coming from the Karamojong ethnic group that is split between
Uganda, Sudan, and Kenya. Battles resulting in territorial change of control are usually even
more devastating involving both a higher number of casualties and ambushes against the civil-
ian population. For example, ACLED reports that in August 1997 when government forces of
11the Democratic Republic of Congo retook control of the town of Watsa, close to the border
with Uganda, where the partitioned Alur reside, this resulted in 800 casualties.18
Violent events against civilians include the raids of the Janjaweed militias against civilian
population in the Darfur region in Eastern Sudan; the assaults and tortures against the civilian
population by President’s Mugabe’s Central Intelligence Organization in Zimbabwe; the killings
of civilians in Northern and Western Rwanda by the Interahamwe Hutu ethnic militias (that
are raiding from their bases in Eastern Congo and Uganda); and the killings, abductions,
rapes, and terrorist activities of numerous militia groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Violent events include also the burning of churches (by militias in Eastern Congo, Sudan, and
Nigeria), tortures (that are widespread in the border of Zaire and Uganda), hostage-taking and
child-soldiering raids. Going over the narratives of each event reveals that they may be also
quite devastating. For example, in a single event in Eastern Congo in May 1997 "ADLF rebels
moved in and took control of Mbandaka slaughtering 200 Rwandan Hutu refugees".
2.2.1 Data Patterns
Figure 2a maps the spatial distribution of all conﬂict events over the period 1997 − 2010.
There is signiﬁcant heterogeneity in the incidence of political violence across Africa. There
are numerous conﬂict events in Central Africa, mostly in Eastern Congo, Rwanda, Burundi,
Sudan, and Uganda. In Western Africa, conﬂict and political violence are mostly present in
Nigeria, especially in areas close to the Niger delta and in Sierra Leone. Moreover, political
violence is pervasive in Somalia and Ethiopia, as well as in Zimbabwe and the Northern regions
of South Africa. In contrast there are few events in Botswana, Zambia, Tanzania, Namibia,
and Gabon. There is also considerable variation within countries. For example, while conﬂict
incidence in Tanzania is low, there are quite a few violent incidents along the border with Kenya
and Rwanda, though not as much as at the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Likewise, most of the conﬂict in Senegal is concentrated on the Southern region of Casamance,
while most conﬂict in Angola is close to the border with Congo and in the Cabinda enclave.
To construct the conﬂict intensity per ethnic homeland we project ACLED’s mapping of
conﬂict events (Figure 2a) on Murdock’s ethnolinguistic map (Figure 1a). Figure 2b portrays
18A proper analysis of the number of casualties is hindered by the fact that the ACLED dataset does not
systematically report the number of casualties per incident.
12the spatial distribution of all civil conﬂict incidents at the ethnic-homeland level.
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We also examine the eﬀect of partitioning on the number of battles and violence against
civilians, as these are the dominant and deadly types of conﬂict. Figures 3a and 3b plot the
number of battles and an indicator that identiﬁes ethnic homelands where a battle resulted in
a territorial change, respectively. Figure 3c portrays the number of events involving violence
against civilians. The correlation between battles’ intensity and violence against civilians in
high, but far from perfect (0.60). For example, in most areas in Zimbabwe we observe a large
number of violent events against civilians with very few conﬂict incidents between military
actors. Conversely in Ethiopia and Sudan we predominantly observe armed conﬂict between
the government and rebel groups rather than unilateral violent events against civilians. In the
Democratic Republic of Congo and in Uganda the number of battles go hand in hand with
violence against civilians. The correlation between battles resulting in a territorial change and
the total number of battles is 0.59 and with violent events against civilians is 0.22 (Appendix
Table 1). This suggests that in our empirical analysis we can examine the eﬀect of ethnic
partitioning not only on overall political violence but also on its individual components.
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2.2.2 Summary Statistics
Table 1 reports descriptive/summary statistics for the main outcome variables across the 826
ethnic homelands.19 In Panel A we report summary statistics (mean and medians) across all
ethnic homelands, while in Panel B we report statistics for homelands close to the national
border (using the median value of distance to the border; 102 kilometers). This helps us isolate
the role of ethnic partitioning from an overall border eﬀect (which, nonetheless, may still be
driven by partitioning).
Civil Conﬂict Incidents: All Types Three-fourths of all ethnic areas have experi-
enced at least one conﬂict event over the period 1997−2010 (column(1)). 84% of all partitioned
ethnicities (193 out of 230) experienced some conﬂict, while the likelihood of a civil conﬂict
incidence for non-partitioned ethnicities is 11 percentage points lower (73%). When we focus
on groups close to the border (Table 1- Panel B), we observe similar -and if anything larger-
diﬀerences; on average 65% of non-partitioned ethnic homelands experienced a conﬂict, while
83% of partitioned ethnicities suﬀered some type of conﬂict.
Partitioned groups have also experienced more violent events than non-split ones. On
average partitioned ethnicities experienced 64.75 incidents, while for the rest 47.6 incidents
were recorded. This diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant because there are some extreme
cases (outliers) both across partitioned and non-split ethnic groups (see Appendix Table 2).
To account for outliers we exclude ethnic homelands where capitals fall (in columns (4) and
(5)) and homelands where the number of armed conﬂicts exceeds the 99th percentile (in (6)-
(7)). The diﬀerences in the mean number of conﬂict incidents between partitioned and non-split
groups continue to be large (17.4 and 21.9) and are now statistically signiﬁcant at the 99% level.
19In Supplementary Appendix Table 2 we report summary statistics for all outcome and control variables,
both at the ethnic homeland level (Panel A) and at the country-ethnic-homeland level (Panel B).
14The median of all conﬂict incidents across all ethnicities is 4. Again there are large diﬀerences
between partitioned (median=13) and non-split ethnicities (median=3). The diﬀerences in
conﬂict intensity between partitioned and non-split ethnic groups are also sizable when we
focus on areas close to the border (Panel B). While the average (median) number of all civil
conﬂict incidents for partitioned ethnicities is 66 (12), for non split ones the average (median)
is 32.3 (1).20
Battles On average 59% of all ethnic homelands have experienced at least one battle
between government forces, rebel groups, or militias. The corresponding likelihood for par-
titioned and non-split groups in the full sample is 63.5% and 57.7%, respectively. When we
restrict estimation in areas close to the national border, the diﬀerence between partitioned and
non-split groups in the probability of experiencing at least one battle is somewhat larger (15%).
On average partitioned ethnic homelands have experienced ten more battles as compared to
non-split groups (29.9 versus 19.8); and while due to outliers this diﬀerence is not statistically
signiﬁcant, once we exclude the top 1% of the distribution or ethnic regions where capitals fall,
the diﬀerence is always signiﬁcant at standard conﬁdence levels. Likewise, the median value of
battles for non-split ethnic groups close to the national border is zero, while the corresponding
median value for partitioned ethnic homelands is 3.
Territorial Control Change The ACLED database also reports battles that resulted
in territorial change of control. Focusing on such battles is interesting as in these cases the local
population is likely to be more dramatically aﬀected. 27% of all ethnic homelands experienced
a territorial change of control; yet partitioned ethnic homelands were aﬀected much more.
The likelihood that a battle resulting in a change of territorial control for partitioned ethnic
homelands is 36%, while the corresponding likelihood for non-split groups is 22.7%. This
pattern suggests that partitioned ethnic groups are more likely to be traumatized as control
oscillates between the government and rebel forces.21
Violence against Civilians The summary statistics of violence against civilians also
reveal large and signiﬁcant diﬀerences between partitioned and non-split groups. The likelihood
that a partitioned ethnicity has experienced at least one violent event against the civilian
20The results are similar if we use a narrower threshold of distance to the national border to identify ethnic
homelands close to the national border. For example when we use the 25% percentile of distance to the border
(45 km), the average (median) number of civil conﬂict incidents for partitioned ethnicities is 47 (8.5) while for
non-split ethnicities 4.6 (1).
21Similarly the likelihood that headquarters of rebel groups or militias are established in the homeland of
partitioned ethnicities is 25.2% while the corresponding likelihood for non-split ethnic groups is 9.4%; when we
focus in areas close to the national border the corresponding probabilities are 25.4% and 13.4%, respectively.
15population is 0.70, while the corresponding likelihood for not split ethnicities is 0.57. The
diﬀerence is even larger when we focus on ethnic homelands close to the national border (0.24).
On average partitioned ethnic homelands experience 24 violent incidents against the civilian
population, while the average for non-split ethnicities is 17.6. The median value of violence
against civilians across partitioned ethnic homelands is three times the median value across non-
split ethnic groups (3 versus 1) independently on whether we examine all ethnic homelands or
we limit our attention to regions close to the national border.
3 Borders Artiﬁciality
3.1 Empirical Speciﬁcation
In this section we explore potential correlates of ethnic partitioning estimating models of the
following form:22
SPLITi (FRACi) = ar + X￿
iΨ + Z￿
iΘ + ei. (1)
The dependent variable, SPLITi, equals one when at least 10% of the historical homeland
of an ethnic group i has been partitioned into more than one contemporary states. We also
show results using the continuous measure of partitioning, FRACi. Xi is a vector of geographic,
ecological, natural resource at the ethnicity level; Zi is a vector of ethnic-speciﬁc pre-colonial
institutional, cultural, and economic traits, extracted from Murdock’s (1967) Ethnographic
Atlas available for a subset of ethnicities. Appendix Table 2 gives summary statistics for
all variables. In all speciﬁcations we include region-speciﬁc constants (ar) to account for the
somewhat diﬀerent timing and patterns of colonization.
3.2 Results
Table 2 reports the results. Odd-numbered speciﬁcations report probit (maximum-likelihood)
marginal eﬀects, where the dependent variable is the benchmark binary partitioning index
(SPLIT). Even-numbered columns report LS estimates, where the dependent variable is the
continuous measure of partitioning (FRACi).23
Geographical, Ecological, and Natural Resource Measures In Panel A we ex-
plore the role of geographic, ecological, and natural resources. Speciﬁcations (1)-(2) show that
22Examining formally whether there are systematic diﬀerences in observable characteristics between split and
non-split groups is necessary because in some cases Europeans did try taking into account local conditions
(for example when German West Africa was split into Urundi and Rwanda). In two cases (Cameroon-Nigeria;
Ghana-Togo) there were referenda on the redrawing of borders at independence. We also had the secession of
Eritrea from Ethiopia (in 1993) and the uniﬁcation of Tanganyika and Zanzibar (in 1964).
23The results are similar if we estimate Tobit models that account for truncation (at zero) of the continuous
partitioning index.
16ethnic groups spanning large territories in the pre-colonial period are more likely to be par-
titioned. This ﬁnding is in line with the historical evidence that colonizers drew borders in
an arbitrary manner. The estimates further show that ethnicities residing in areas with larger
water bodies (lakes and rivers) were more likely to ﬁnd themselves split by the national bound-
aries. This result is in accord with the historical narrative that Europeans in some instances
attempted to use natural barriers while delineating the spheres of their inﬂuence.
In columns (3)-(4) we augment the speciﬁcation with an index reﬂecting the average land
quality for agriculture and average elevation. We also add the respective standard deviations
measures to proxy for ruggedness and the variance of land quality. All four geographic features
enter with insigniﬁcant estimates.24
In columns (5)-(6) we examine whether partitioned and non-partitioned ethnic homelands
diﬀer with regards to ecological conditions, augmenting the empirical model with a malaria
stability index (taken from Kiszewski et al. (2004)) and distance to the coast. Since Europeans
settled mainly in areas by the coast and regions where malaria was less pervasive, these models
also shed light on whether contact with colonizers aﬀected partitioning. Both indicators enter
with small and statistically indistinguishable from zero coeﬃcients.
In columns (7)-(8) we include indicators identifying ethnic areas with diamond mines and
petroleum ﬁelds. While in the initial phase of colonization Europeans were mostly interested in
agricultural goods and minerals, adding these two indicators allows us to investigate whether
partitioned groups diﬀer from non-partitioned ones in terms of natural resources. There are no
systematic diﬀerences in this dimension.
Measures of European Contact and Early Development In Panel B columns
(1)-(4) we examine whether early contact with Europeans either during the slave trades or
during the initial phase of colonization correlates with ethnic partitioning. In columns (1)-(2)
we regress the partitioning indicators on the log number of slaves exported during the slave
trades. In columns (3)-(4) we regress the partitioning measures on the average distance of each
ethnic group to the main European exploration routes (using data from Nunn (2009)). Both
variables enter with an insigniﬁcant estimate showing that early contact with colonizers is not
related to ethnic partitioning.
24In some speciﬁcations mean land suitability for agriculture enters with a (weakly) signiﬁcant estimate. We
further explored the role of land quality and dependence on agriculture using alternative measures and numerous
model permutations. Overall the correlation between ethnic partitioning and land quality is weak and in most
speciﬁcations statistically indistinguishable from zero (see for example the results in Supplementary Appendix
3). Even in the models where some index of land’s suitability for agriculture enters with a signiﬁcant estimate,
the economic magnitude is small. Moreover, in our analysis of the eﬀect of ethnic partitioning on civil conﬂict
we are reporting speciﬁcations accounting for land quality as well as numerous other local geographic controls,
showing that this has no impact on the coeﬃcient of the partitioning index.
17In columns (5)-(6) we explore whether pre-colonial ethnic economic development was
taken into account when the colonial borders were being designed. We proxy the pre-slave
trade level of economic development using an indicator variable that equals one when a city
with population exceeding 20,000 people in 1400 AD was present in the historical homeland
of an ethnicity and zero otherwise (using data from Chandler (1987)). There is no evidence
that ethnicities with historical urban centers were diﬀerentially treated. Similarly, in columns
(7)-(8), using Murdock’s (1967) data, we show that there are no diﬀerences in the type of pre-
colonial settlements. The settlement pattern variable ranges from 0 to 7 with higher numbers
indicating more complex and thus more densely populated local communities.25
Ethnic-Speciﬁc Pre-colonial Traits In Panel C we examine whether other ethnic-
speciﬁc pre-colonial institutional, cultural, and economic traits correlate with partitioning,
using the rich information provided in Murdock’s (1967) Ethnographic Atlas.
In columns (1)-(2) we investigate whether Europeans took into account the degree of
political centralization of the African ethnicities when designing the borders. Following Gen-
naioli and Rainer (2006, 2007), we proxy political centralization with an indicator variable
that equals zero when Murdock assigns an ethnicity either as "stateless" or "a petty chiefdom"
(e.g. Xam or the Ibo); and becomes 1 when the ethnicity is part of either a "large paramount
chiefdom" or a "large state" (e.g. Thonga and Zulu). In columns (3)-(4) we examine whether
the societal structure correlates with partitioning using Murdock’s class stratiﬁcation index.
The index ranges from zero, indicating societies without any class distinctions, to four for eth-
nicities with signiﬁcant class and wealth distinctions. Class stratiﬁcation may also proxy for
institutional and economic development, since pre-colonially stratiﬁed societies were usually
more developed.
African scholars argue that pre-colonial economic and institutional development was
higher in areas with intensive use of agriculture (Fenske (2009) provides empirical evidence
supportive of this conjecture); thus in columns (5)-(6) we augment the speciﬁcation with a
0 − 10 index measuring the importance of agriculture for subsistence at the ethnicity level.
In columns (7)-(8) we examine whether ethnic partitioning is systematically related to pas-
toralism using a 0 − 10 range index of ethnicity’s dependence on animal husbandry. Finally,
in Appendix Table 3 we further explore the association between partitioning and numerous
other ethnic-speciﬁc variables from Murdock (1967) measuring the dependence of the econ-
omy on agriculture, ﬁshing, hunting, the type of family organization, the presence of rules for
25We also regressed the ethnic partitioning measures on a dummy variable that identiﬁes societies living in
compact and/or relatively permanent or complex settlements, failing again to detect a signiﬁcant correlation
(Supplementary Appendix 3).
18inheritance, the role of clans.
There is no evidence that partitioned ethnic groups diﬀer along this host of pre-colonial
traits.
Country-Fixed-Eﬀects Estimates Since in most speciﬁcations below we associate
civil conﬂict with ethnic partitioning exploring within-country variation, one would like to
know whether post independence there are systematic diﬀerences between partitioned ethnici-
ties and non-split groups within countries. Table 3 reports country-ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcations
associating geographical, ecological, and natural resource features with ethnic partitioning. In
this case the unit of analysis becomes an ethnicity-country observation assigning each partition
of a group to the corresponding country. The evidence in Table 3 suggests that there is no
systematic association between these traits and ethnic partitioning. Interestingly, the positive
correlation between surface and water area and partitioning found in Table 2 turns now in-
signiﬁcant. This is because after partitioning both the overall surface area and the area under
water of split groups within a country are comparable to those of non-partitioned ethnicities.
Summary The results reported in Tables 2 − 3 and Appendix Table 3 are broadly
consistent with the historical narrative on the arbitrary design of African borders. Out of
dozens of potentially relevant variables, only surface area and the presence of water streams
correlate robustly with partitioning. Perhaps more importantly, the overall explanatory power
of the models is poor. Mc Fadden’s pseudo-R2 (that compares the log likelihood value of
the constant-only model with that of the full speciﬁcation) is low across all permutations,
at most 0.07. Likewise, the R2 of the OLS models is below 0.13. The probit speciﬁcations
perform quite poorly in predicting which ethnicities have been partitioned. For example, the
speciﬁcation with all the geographical, ecological, and natural resource measures in Table 2-
Panel A (not reported) predicts correctly (G(X￿
iΨ + Z￿
iΘ + aj) > 0.5) only 29 out of the 231
partitions with the benchmark index (SPLIT). So, although we cannot rule out the possibility
that some unobservable characteristic may correlate with partitioning, the evidence suggests
that ethnic partitioning is not correlated with observable factors that may independently aﬀect
civil conﬂict.
4 Partitioning and Civil Conﬂict
4.1 Econometric Speciﬁcation
We estimate the long-run eﬀect of the scramble for Africa on contemporary civil conﬂict running
variants of the following empirical speciﬁcation:
19yi,c = ac + γSPLITi + X￿
i,cΦ + εi,c. (2)
The dependent variable, yi,c, reﬂects civil conﬂict in the historical homeland of ethnic
group i in country c. In the country-ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcations (with ac), each partition of a
group is assigned to the corresponding country c. For example, conﬂict in the part of the Lobi
in Ivory Coast is assigned to Ivory Coast, while conﬂict in Lobbi’s homeland in Burkina Faso
is assigned to Burkina Faso.26 The coeﬃcient γ on SPLIT captures the direct (local) eﬀect of
ethnic partitioning on civil conﬂict.
Vector X￿
i,c includes geographical controls, like surface and water area; ecological fea-
tures, such as a malaria stability index and land’s suitability for agriculture; natural resources
reﬂecting the presence of diamond mines and petroleum ﬁelds; early development proxies such
as having a major city in 1400. To further account for location characteristics, in almost all
speciﬁcations we control for the distance to the coast, the distance to the national border, the
distance to the capital city, and an indicator for regions where capital cities are located. To
minimize concerns that the coeﬃcient on the partitioning index captures an overall border eﬀect
(which however may itself be driven by partitioning), we also report speciﬁcations restricting
estimation to ethnic homelands close to the national border.
Estimation and Inference Since the dependent variable (all conﬂict incidents, num-
ber of battles, number of violent events against civilians) is a count variable, we estimate
negative binomial models with maximum likelihood (Wooldridge (2002)).27 This negative bi-
nomial model accounts for the many zeros, as well as for the fact that there are a few extreme
observations in the right tail of the distribution of the dependent variable. Moreover, the non-
linear estimator is appealing because it does not require log-linearizing the dependent variable
and thus preserves the higher moments of the distribution (see Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and
Silva, Tenreyro, and Windmeijer (2010)). To illustrate the robustness of our estimates, we
also report log-linear LS speciﬁcations taking the log of one plus the respective civil conﬂict
measure as the dependent variable.28 To further account for outliers, we report speciﬁcations
excluding homelands hosting capital cities or groups where the dependent variable exceeds the
top 1%.
In all speciﬁcations we account for spatially correlated residuals clustering standard errors
at the country level and at the ethnic-family level using the multi-way method of Cameron,
26In the previous draft, where the unit of analysis was the entire ethnic homeland, we assigned partitioned
ethnicities to the country where the centroid of the historical homeland falls, ﬁnding similar results.
27Due to overdispersion in the number of battles and the number of violent events against civilians, speciﬁcation
tests reject the Poisson model, favoring the negative binomial model.
28Standardizing the dependent variable with land area or population yields similar results.
20Gelbach, and Miller (2011). This correction also accounts for arbitrary residual correlation
within each country and within each ethnic family. Moreover, double clustering accounts for
spatial correlation.29 We also estimated standard errors using Conley’s method to account
for spatial dependence of an unknown form, ﬁnding similar (and if anything less conservative)
standard errors.
4.2 Cross-Sectional Estimates
We start our analysis estimating the relationship between partitioning and civil conﬂict across
the 826 ethnic homelands (without country ﬁxed eﬀects). Table 4 reports the results. In
column (1) we simply control for log population using the ﬁrst post-independence census es-
timate (for most countries in the 1960s or 1970s), the log of surface area, and the log of area
under water, the only variables found to correlate with partitioning in Table 2. In line with
the descriptive analysis, the coeﬃcient on the partitioning index is positive (0.76) and highly
signiﬁcant. Adding region constants (in (2)) has little eﬀect on the estimate. In column (3) we
control for location augmenting the speciﬁcation with the distance from the centroid of each
ethnic homeland to (i) the national border, (ii) the sea coast, and (iii) the capital city. We
also include an indicator for ethnic homelands where capitals fall. Overall, distance to the sea
enters with a positive and signiﬁcant estimate suggesting that there is less conﬂict in areas
close to the sea. Distance to the capital enters with a positive estimate suggesting that there
is more conﬂict in regions further from the capitals, though the coeﬃcient is not always signif-
icant. Distance to the border enters with a negative sign; yet the coeﬃcient is not statistically
signiﬁcant. The capital city indicator enters with a positive and highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient.
This is not surprising as violent events against civilians, riots, and protests often take place in
the capitals. In spite of the inclusion of these signiﬁcant covariates, the partitioning indicator
drops only slightly (0.674) and retains signiﬁcance at the 99% level.
Column (4) includes a rich set of controls, reﬂecting geography (land suitability for agri-
culture, elevation, malaria) and natural resources (indicators for diamond mines or oil deposits).
Accounting for these factors seems a priori important, because the cross-country literature doc-
uments signiﬁcant correlations between these variables and various aspects of civil warfare. For
example, Fearon and Laitin (2003) ﬁnd that there is a higher likelihood of civil conﬂict in moun-
tainous countries. Likewise, both cross-country works (e.g. Ross (2006)) and regional studies
(e.g. Buhaug and Rod (2006); Bellows and Miguel (2009)) show that conﬂict is higher in areas
29Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011) explicitly cite spatial correlation as an application of the multi-way
clustering method. See Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) for analogous applica-
tions of the multi-way clustering method in accounting for spatial correlation. Murdock (1959) assigns the 834
ethnic groups into 96 ethnolinguistic clusters/families.
21with diamond mines and petroleum ﬁelds. Moreover, Cervellati, Sunde, and Valmori (2011)
document a strong positive correlation between the disease environment and civil conﬂict. The
magnitude on the partitioning index remains unaﬀected. This is consistent with the ﬁndings
in Table 2 showing that partitioning is uncorrelated with these characteristics.30 In column
(5) we drop outliers (top 1% of the dependent variable), while in column (6) we exclude ethnic
regions where capitals fall. This has little eﬀect on the ethnic partitioning index. The most
conservative estimate implies that partitioned ethnicities experience an increase of approxi-
mately 162 log points in the number of civil conﬂict incidents. This translates into an 85%
increase in civil conﬂict activity (exp(0.62) − 1 = 0.85) in areas where partitioned ethnicities
reside (as compared to the homelands of non-split ethnicities). The eﬀect of ethnic partitioning
on civil conﬂict is quantitatively as strong as the eﬀect of the petroleum indicator, that enters
in almost all speciﬁcations with a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient.
In (7)-(12) we restrict estimation to ethnic areas close to the national border. This allows
us to compare civil conﬂict intensity between partitioned ethnicities and other at-the-border
ethnic groups that were not directly aﬀected by the artiﬁcial border design. We now have a
more balanced sample with 213 partitioned ethnicities and 200 non-split ethnic groups. Across
all permutations the coeﬃcient on the partitioning index is positive and highly signiﬁcant,
reassuring that our estimates in the full sample are not capturing an overall border eﬀect.31
4.3 Within-Country Analysis
Baseline Country Fixed Eﬀects Estimates The positive association between eth-
nic partitioning and civil conﬂict shown in Table 4 (and the descriptive analysis in Table
1) may be driven by hard-to-account-for country-wide factors. In Table 5 we thus estimate
country-ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcations associating civil conﬂict across ethnicity-country homelands
with partitioning. Columns (1)-(6) report estimates in the full sample, while columns (7)-(12)
present results across homelands that are close to the national border (using the median value
of distance to the national border, which at the ethnicity-country homeland level is 61km).
The coeﬃcient on the ethnic partitioning index in (1) and (2) is positive and more than
two standard errors larger than zero. The estimate in column (2) implies that on average
civil conﬂict intensity is higher in homelands of partitioned groups by approximately 60%
30In all speciﬁcations the natural resource measures enter with a positive statistically signiﬁcant estimate.
There is also some weak evidence that civil conﬂict is higher in mountainous regions.
31We also estimated speciﬁcations trying to account for externalities using a similar to Miguel and Kremer
(2004) speciﬁcation; there is some weak, though insigniﬁcant, evidence of spatial spillovers from the historical
homeland of partitioned ethnicities to adjacent ethnic regions. It should be noted that if there are spillovers
(externalities) from the historical homelands of partitioned ethnic groups (the "treatment" group) to neighboring
regions where non-split ethnicities reside (the "control" group), then the estimate on the partitioning index will
be a lower bound of the true eﬀect.
22(exp(0.47) − 1 = 0.60). In column (3) we control for distance to the national border, distance
to the sea coast, distance to the capital, and the capital city dummy. The coeﬃcient, if anything,
increases in absolute value, and becomes more precisely estimated. Conditioning on the rich
set of controls and accounting for outliers either by excluding observations where capitals fall
or by dropping areas where the dependent variable exceeds the top 1% has no eﬀect on the
estimated magnitude. In columns (7)-(12) we restrict estimation across ethnic areas that are
close to the national border. Across all speciﬁcations the coeﬃcient on ethnic partitioning is
positive and highly signiﬁcant.32
Ethnic Partitioning and Type of Civil Conﬂict In Table 6 we examine the eﬀect
of ethnic partitioning on the diﬀerent types of conﬂict.33 The coeﬃcients on ethnic partitioning
in columns (1)-(2) imply that ﬁghting between government forces, militias, and rebel groups
is more pervasive in the historical homelands of partitioned groups; the estimated magnitudes
suggest that on average partitioned groups experience approximately 80% (exp(0.60)−1 = 0.82)
more battles as compared to non-split ethnic groups. Limiting our focus to ethnic areas close
to the national border has little eﬀect on the estimate.
Ethnic partitioning is also systematically linked with violence against civilians by the
government forces or rebel groups. This shows that partitioning has not only resulted into
more warfare between armed forces, but has been particularly devastating for the civilian
populations. The estimate in column (3) implies that there are 65% (exp(0.50) − 1 = 0.65)
more violent incidents against civilians in the homelands of partitioned ethnicities.
In columns (5), (6), (11), and (12) we report linear probability models associating par-
titioning with the likelihood that a change in territorial control occurs in an ethnic homeland.
The estimates show that partitioned ethnic homelands are more likely to swing between diﬀer-
ent control groups. The coeﬃcient in (12), where we restrict estimation to ethnic areas close
to the national border, implies that there is a 5% higher likelihood that a battle resulting in
a change of territorial control occurs in the homeland of a partitioned ethnicity. This eﬀect is
not small, as in the country-ethnic homeland sample, the overall likelihood that a territorial
change takes place is around 20%.
Linear Speciﬁcations In Table 7, columns (1)-(3) and (6)-(8) we report linear spec-
iﬁcations using the natural log of one plus the total number of civil conﬂict incidents as the
32We also identiﬁed at-the-national-border ethnic homelands as those where the distance of the closest edge
of each ethnic polygon from the national border is zero. Thus in these models we compare partitioned ethnic
homelands with those that are by the border, but not partitioned. The coeﬃcient on the ethnic partitioning
index enters with a positive and signiﬁcant estimate.
33Appendix Table 4 reports analogous cross-sectional speciﬁcations at the ethnic homeland level.
23dependent variable. The estimate on the partitioning index is positive and highly signiﬁcant
both in the full sample and when we restrict estimation in areas close to the border. Columns
(4) and (9) report linear probability models where the dependent variable is a dummy identify-
ing areas that have experienced some civil conﬂict. While by solely looking at the "extensive"
margin of civil conﬂict, we do not exploit the richness of the data, we further account for
the nonlinear nature of the dependent variable. Moreover, these speciﬁcations shed light on
whether the eﬀect of ethnic partitioning on civil conﬂict (shown in Tables 4 − 6) operates at
the intensive or extensive margin of conﬂict. The estimate on ethnic partitioning implies that
there is an 8% higher likelihood that a partitioned group will suﬀer at least one civil conﬂict.
We also estimated linear probability models using as the cutoﬀ threshold the median number
of civil conﬂicts (median equals 2). Thus in columns (5) and (10) the dependent variable takes
on the value of one for ethnic homelands that experienced more than two civil conﬂict incidents
during the period 1997 − 2010 and zero otherwise. The coeﬃcient on the ethnic partitioning
index retains its economic and statistical signiﬁcance.
4.4 Example: Conﬂict in East-Central Africa
East-Central Africa, one of the most conﬂict-prone regions in the world, oﬀers an illustration
of our empirical results.
Let us start from Tanzania, a country with little overall conﬂict; in the 69 ethnic regions
of Tanzania there have been 175 conﬂict incidents over the period 1997 − 2010. The mean
(median) conﬂict per ethnic homeland is 2.5 (0). Most conﬂict (19 incidents) occurs at the
border with Rwanda where the partitioned Rundi tribes reside. Conﬂict also spreads to the
nearby homeland of the (ethnically similar) Ha, where both militias based in nearby Rwanda
and Burundi raid against the civilian population looting, raping, and terrorizing the local
population. In contrast, at the border with Uganda where the non-split Haya group resides
there are only 4 conﬂict incidents. Interestingly, there is zero conﬂict in the non-split homelands
of the Bende and the Pipa, although both groups reside at the border with the Democratic
Republic of Congo, the country with the highest conﬂict intensity in Africa. This is because lake
Tanganyika is the natural border between Tanzania and Zaire. Focusing now on the northern
border of Tanzania with Kenya, there is recurring conﬂict in the homeland of the partitioned
Maasai (in total 10 incidents) and (to a lesser extent) in the partitioned Digo along the Indian
Ocean. For example, ACLED documents a deadly ﬁght resulting in the death of (at least)
30 farmers by Maasai militia on December 8th 2000. In contrast, there is zero conﬂict in the
Eastern part of the Tanzania-Kenya border where the non-split Pare group resides. Moreover,
and in line with our results, there is no conﬂict at the Kenyan side of the border populated by
24the non-split Teita group.
Focusing now on the Democratic Republic of Congo, there are 4,333 conﬂict events
across the 102 ethnic regions (mean=26; median=4). In the homelands of the three partitioned
Ruanda ethnicities (of the Interlacustrine Bantu - Rwanda family) we have 946 incidents (i.e.
more than 20% of all conﬂict in Congo); and in the two adjacent (non-split), but ethnically
similar Rwanda groups of the Hunde and Toro we have 409 and 27 events, respectively. Going
over the event narratives reveals that conﬂict in Eastern Congo is (partly at least) driven by
partitioning, as it involves ethnic militias (such as the FDLR) that constantly move across the
border between Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda. The FDLR and other Hutu-based militias,
which ﬂed Rwanda after the 1994 genocide and sought shelter in their homeland in Eastern
Congo, had played a major role in the recent civil conﬂict in Congo. Not only there are
hundreds of conﬂict incidents in the homeland of the partitioned Rwandan tribes, but going
over the event narratives reveals that these events had been very devastating.34
In contrast there is no conﬂict at the (non-split) Holoholo ethnic homeland on the Western
(Zairian) bank of the Tanganyika lake; yet the adjacent to the Holoholo ethnic group in the
South, the Tabwa (a Bantu tribe) has experienced 91 conﬂict events, 10 of those being major
battles resulting in a change of territorial control. This is not surprising since, although the
Eastern border of Congo with Tanzania is organic (Tanganyika lake), the Southern one with
Zambia follows a latitudinal line that splits the homeland of the Tabwa almost equally between
Congo and Zambia. Moreover, there is zero conﬂict in the nearby (further to the south) border
group of the Shila in Congo that has not been aﬀected by the artiﬁcial line splitting Zambia
and Congo. In line also with our results there is no conﬂict on the other side of the border
opposite to the Shila in Zambia where the non-split Luapula group resides.
34For example, in early 2007 in just one event, FDLR groups raided two villages killing 17 civilians and
wounding 19. In the following day FDLR militias looted 18 houses in a nearby town. Also in an single event in
Fendula in Eastern Congo, (at least) 30 civilians were burned alive and 50 wounded by Rwanda militias. Prunier
(2009) provides a detailed narrative of how the partitioning of the Rwandan tribes and the genocide in Rwanda
spread to Congo leading to the recent devastating civil war.
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We perturbed the empirical model in various ways to explore the robustness of our results. In
this section we report the main sensitivity checks.
Alternative Measures of Partitioning First, we repeated estimation using alterna-
tive measures of ethnic partitioning. Table 8 report the results. Columns (1)-(3) and (7)-(9)
present results associating civil conﬂict with the continuous index of partitioning (FRAC) that
reﬂects the likelihood that a historical ethnic homeland falls into more than one contemporary
state. The ethnic partitioning measure enters with a positive and highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient,
implying that a higher degree of ethnic partitioning is associated with a higher likelihood of
civil conﬂict. In columns (4)-(6) and (10)-(12) we regress civil conﬂict on a binary index of
ethnic partitioning using a 5% threshold to identify split groups. This has little eﬀect on our
baseline results. The estimate implies that there is a 65% higher incidence of civil conﬂict
events in the homelands of partitioned groups.
Unobservables Second, to further account for unobservable characteristics that vary
smoothly in space (see Dell (2010)), in Table 9A, columns (1)-(4) we augment the speciﬁcation
26with a cubic polynomial in latitude and longitude of the centroid of an ethnic group in each
country .35 The coeﬃcient on the partitioning index remains virtually unaﬀected. Moreover,
the estimate retains signiﬁcance at the 99% conﬁdence level. In columns (5)-(8) we include
ethnic-family ﬁxed eﬀects to account both for local conditions and broad cultural, institutional,
and other hard-to-observe ethnic-speciﬁc factors (see Nunn (2012)). Examples of ethnic families
include the Bedouin Arabs, the Tuareg, and the Southwestern Bantu. The estimates suggest
that, even when we solely examine within-country, within-ethnic-family variation, civil conﬂict
is signiﬁcantly more pervasive in border areas belonging to partitioned ethnicities. In columns
(9)-(12) we report speciﬁcations with both ethnic-family ﬁxed eﬀects and the third-order poly-
nomial in latitude and longitude; while we may be over-ﬁtting, the coeﬃcient on the ethnic
partitioning index retains its economic and statistical signiﬁcance.
Location Third, we estimated models dropping iteratively ethnic homelands from each
of the 5 African regions to investigate whether the results are driven by a particular part of
the continent. Table 9B reports the results. Odd-numbered columns show results in the
full sample and even-numbered columns report results for ethnic areas close to the national
border. In (1)-(2) we exclude North Africa to account for the fact that Europeans had contacts
with the northern part of the continent since the ancient times. In (3)-(4) we drop Southern
African countries. In columns (5)-(6) we drop Western African countries because some of the
contemporary African borders in this region correspond to internal administrative borders of
the Federation of the French West Africa. In (7)-(8) and (9)-(10) we exclude ethnic areas in
East Africa and Central Africa, respectively. This allows us to examine the robustness of our
results to inﬂuential observations, as the most deadly and prolonged conﬂicts have taken place
in Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The results
show that the strong positive eﬀect of ethnic partitioning on civil conﬂict is not driven by a
particular region. In all speciﬁcations the partitioning index enters with a highly signiﬁcant
estimate, similar in magnitude to the (more eﬃcient) estimates in Table 5.
Partitioning and Civil Wars In the previous draft of the paper we used geo-referenced
data from the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO; Raleigh, Cunningham, Wilhemsen, and
Gleditsch (2006)) on African civil wars over the 1970 − 2005 ﬁnding (as in the current draft)
that ethnic partitioning is associated with a higher number and more prolonged civil conﬂicts.
However, a limitation of the PRIO mapping of conﬂicts is that it reports rough approximations
of the location of civil wars using a centroid for each war and a coarse radius. However as
the data code-book states each conﬂict, instead of having a circular zone (as the mapping sug-







27gests), the actual shape is more likely to follow the contours of mountains and rivers. Moreover,
the PRIO identiﬁes (major and minor) civil wars using information only from battle-related
casualties.36
Despite these obvious shortcomings in Table 10 we reproduce the basic ﬁndings. Overall
there are 49 civil and internationalized internal wars over the period 1970 − 2005; these wars
played out in 77 conﬂict zones. Out of the 826 ethnicities 343 experienced a civil war in their
historical homeland; 199 ethnicities experienced two distinct incidents of armed conﬂict; 54
ethnicities experienced 3 civil wars while 12 regions were aﬀected by four or even ﬁve conﬂicts.37
Table 10 reports Poisson maximum likelihood estimates using the number of civil wars (in (1)-
(2)) and the number of war zones (in (3)-(4)) at the ethnic homeland level as the dependent
variable. To illustrate the robustness of our results we report speciﬁcations controlling for
location, geographical features, as well as unobserved ethnic-family and spatial characteristics.
Moreover, in the country ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcations we assign an ethnic homeland to a single
country using the centroid of each homeland. The estimates show that partitioned ethnicities
are signiﬁcantly more likely to experience major civil wars.
Alternative Mapping of Ethnic Homelands and Ethnic Partitioning Fifth,
we repeated the analysis using Ethnologue’s database, that reports the spatial distribution
of linguistic groups in the early/mid 1990s. One advantage is that the Ethnologue explicitly
maps linguistic homelands within each country making the identiﬁcation of partitioned lin-
guistic groups straightforward. Moreover, using a contemporary dataset is useful because it
contains less error than Murdock’s pre-colonial map. The disadvantage is that the current
location of ethnic groups is likely to have been aﬀected by the border drawing, civil conﬂict,
as well as numerous country-level characteristics that aﬀect conﬂict. Ethnologue maps 2405
linguistic groups in Africa out of which 821 are explicitly mapped in more than one countries.
Combining the Ethnologue with the ACLED mapping of conﬂicts we obtain the conﬂict statis-
tics for each linguistic homeland. Partitioned groups are 48% likely to experience at least one
conﬂict compared to 33% for non-partitioned groups. Moreover, conditional on having at least
one conﬂict split groups experience an average of 61 conﬂict incidents whereas non-split ones
register 34 conﬂict events. Overall, partitioned groups have suﬀered an average of 30 conﬂict
incidents in-between 1997 − 2010 whereas those language groups located in a single country
36PRIO identiﬁes wars as "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the
use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25
battle-related deaths."
37The groups with the highest incidence of civil war are the Afar and the Esa, which during the period
1970 − 2005 have experienced 5 civil wars. Both groups have been greatly impacted by the artiﬁcial border
design with the Afar being partitioned between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti, and the Esa being split between
Ethiopia and Somalia.
28have experienced on average 10 conﬂict events. All diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant at
conventional levels. An illustrative example is that of the Acholi group partitioned between
Sudan and Uganda. Both Acholi partitions have suﬀered signiﬁcantly from conﬂict. The Su-
danese partition has experienced 14 conﬂict incidents whereas the part of the Acholi in Uganda
has experiences a staggering 1583 events of political violence.
Table 11 reports cross-sectional and within-country speciﬁcations using the Ethnologue
data. Panel A reports negative binomial maximum likelihood estimates; Panel B reports
analogous LS speciﬁcations using the log of one plus the number of all civil conﬂict events
as the dependent variable. Columns (1)-(6) include all linguistics groups whereas in columns
(7)-(12) we focus on groups whose centroid’s distance to the national boundary is less than the
median distance (86 kilometers). The coeﬃcient on the ethnic partitioning index is positive and
highly signiﬁcant across all permutations. The most conservative estimate in Panel A implies
that conﬂict intensity is approximately 30% (exp(0.267)−1 = 0.30) higher in the contemporary
homelands of partitioned groups.
6 Conclusion
This study examines the consequences of a neglected aspect of colonization, the artiﬁcial draw-
ing of political boundaries among European powers in the end of the 19th century, which in
the eve of African independence led to the partitioning of several ethnicities across the newly
created African states.
In the ﬁrst part of our paper we formally show the artiﬁcial nature of African polit-
ical boundaries. Utilizing information on the spatial distribution of ethnicities at the time
of colonization, we associate ethnic partitioning with various geographic and ethnic-speciﬁc
pre-colonial characteristics. With the sole exceptions of the size of the historical homeland and
water bodies, there are no other signiﬁcant diﬀerences between partitioned and non-partitioned
ethnicities. These results oﬀer support to the African historiography on the accidental and ar-
tiﬁcial drawing of colonial and consequently national borders.
Second, we examine in a quasi-natural experimental setting the eﬀect of ethnic parti-
tioning on civil conﬂict, as this has been hypothesized to be the major consequence of the
scramble for Africa. Our analysis is based on regional data spanning the universe of ethnic
areas across Africa. We exploit a new rich geocoded dataset that reports information on more
than 43,000 conﬂict events over the period 1997 − 2010. The database is quite useful in ex-
amining the eﬀect of ethnic partitioning on various aspects of conﬂict, as it reports both the
precise location of battles between government forces, militias, and rebel groups, as well as the
incidents involving violence against civilians (such as rapes, terrorism, abductions, ﬁres, village
29burning) and episodes of territorial change of control. Our regional focus enables us to solely
examine within-country variation and as such account for all country-level features that may
aﬀect warfare.
We ﬁnd that partitioned ethnicities have suﬀered disproportionately more from civil con-
ﬂict compared to non-split ones. Battles between armed groups, as well as violence against
the civilian population are concentrated in the homelands of partitioned ethnicities. Moreover,
these territories are intensely contested among diﬀerent conﬂict actors having a signiﬁcantly
higher likelihood of a change in territorial control. These results are robust to diﬀerent esti-
mation techniques, alternative classiﬁcations of partitioned ethnicities, accounting for ethnic
family features and geographical characteristics, and more.
The uncovered diﬀerences in the probability and intensity of civil conﬂict, battles and
violence against civilians between partitioned and non-partitioned groups becomes more dra-
matic when viewed in light of the fact that these two groups were socially, culturally and
economically similar in the eve of colonization. Our work thus suggests that the scramble for
Africa, by partitioning ethnicities in diﬀerent countries, laid the seeds of a violent legacy of
civil conﬂict and political violence. Our work suggests that future research should examine
the eﬀects of ethnic partitioning on economic and institutional development. Moreover, our
study calls for future work to uncover the mechanisms via which the scramble for Africa has
aﬀected long-run economic performance. Finally, since border artiﬁciality has been argued to
be present in other parts of the world, such as the Middle East and Eastern Europe, subsequent
works could also study the eﬀects of partitioning in those regions.
307 Data Appendix
Partitioning Index (SPLIT): Indicator variable that equals 1 if at least 10% of the historical
homeland of an ethnic group is partitioned into diﬀerent countries. We also construct and
alternative partitioning index that equals 1 if at least 5% of the historical homeland of an
ethnic group is partitioned into diﬀerent countries. Source: Calculated intersecting Murdock’s
(1959) ethnic map of Africa with the Digital Chart of the World (DCW) shapeﬁle. The latter
contains the polygons delineating the international boundaries in 2000. Appendix Table 1 reports
partitioned ethnicities.
Continuous Measure of Partitioning (FRAC): The index reﬂects the probability
that a square kilometer of an ethnic area falls to a diﬀerent country than the rest of the historical
ethnic homeland. Computed similarly to the Herﬁndahl index. Source: Calculated intersecting
Murdock’s (1959) ethnic map of Africa with the Digital Chart of the World (DCW) shapeﬁle.
The latter contains the polygons delineating the international boundaries in 2000.
All Civil Conﬂict Incidents: Sum of all civil conﬂict incidents. There are 8 event
types. (1) Battles without change of control; (2) Battles where rebel groups gain control of the
location; (3) Battles where the government regains control of a location; (4) Headquarter of
base establishments, where rebel groups establish (via violent or non-violent means) their base;
(5) Non-violent conﬂict events where rebel groups, militias or government forces proceed in
non-violent actions (without active ﬁghting) that are however within the context of an ongoing
civil conﬂict and dispute (e.g. recruitment drives, incursions or rallies); (6) Riots and protests;
(7) Violence again civilians, where armed groups (rebels, militias or government forces) attack
unarmed civilians; (8) Non-Violent transfer of control. Depending on the unit of analysis we
aggregate the data either at the ethnic homeland or at the country-ethnic homeland level. See
Section 2 for details. Source: ACLED.
Battles: Total number of battles between two violent armed groups at the ethnic home-
land (in each country for partitioned ethnicities). Battles include armed conﬂict where a control
of the contested location does not change and conﬂict events resulting in a territorial change
of control. We aggregate the data at the ethnic homeland level and at the country-ethnic
homeland level. See Section 2 for details. Source: ACLED.
Violence against Civilians: Total number of violent events against civilians at the
ethnic homeland (in each country for partitioned ethnicities). Violence against civilians occurs
when any armed/violent group attacks unarmed civilians. Rebels, governments, militias, rioters
can all commit violence against civilians.We aggregate the data at the ethnic homeland level
and at the country-ethnic homeland level. See Section 2 for details. Source: ACLED.
Territorial Change of Control: Indicator that takes on the value of one if a battle
31resulting in change of territorial control takes place at the historical homeland on an ethnic
group / country-ethnicity. Source: ACLED.
Population at Independence: Log of population as recorded in the ﬁrst post indepen-
dence census. Source: UNESCO (1987). Available at: http://na.unep.net/datasets/datalist.php.
Land Area: Log surface area of the historical homeland of each ethnic group in 1000s
of sq. km. Source: Global Mapping International, Colorado Springs, Colorado, USA.
Water Area: Log of one plus the total area of the historical homeland of each ethnic
group covered by rivers or lakes in sq. km. Source: Constructed using the "Inland water area
features" dataset from Global Mapping International, Colorado Springs, Colorado, USA.
Elevation: Average value (and standard deviation) of elevation in kilometers. Source:
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and U.S. National Geophysical
Data Center, TerrainBase, release 1.0 (CD-ROM), Boulder, Colorado.
http://www.sage.wisc.edu/atlas/data.php?incdataset=Topography
Land Suitability for Agriculture: Average value (and standard deviation) of land
quality for cultivation. The index is the product of two components reﬂecting the climatic and
soil suitability for cultivation. Source: Michalopoulos (2011); Original Source: Atlas of the
Biosphere. Available at http://www.sage.wisc.edu/iamdata/grid_data_sel.php.
Malaria Stability Index: The index takes into account the prevalence and type of
mosquitoes indigenous to a region, their human biting rate, their daily survival rate, and their
incubation period. The index has been constructed for 0.5 degree by 0.5 degree grid-cells. We
use the average value for each ethnic homeland (and for each country-ethnic region). Source:
Kiszewski, Mellinger, Spielman, Malaney, Sachs, and Sachs (2004)
Distance to the National Border: The geodesic distance of the centroid of the
historical homeland of each ethnic group from the nearest national border, measured in 1000s
of km’s. Source: Global Mapping International, Colorado Springs, Colorado, USA. Series
name: Global Ministry Mapping System. Series issue: Version 3.0
Distance to the Capital: The geodesic distance of the centroid of the historical home-
land of each ethnic group from the capital city, measured in 1000s of km’s. Source: Global
Mapping International, Colorado Springs, Colorado, USA. Series name: Global Ministry Map-
ping System. Series issue: Version 3.0
Distance to the Sea: The geodesic distance of the centroid of the historical homeland
of each ethnic group from the nearest coastline, measured in 1000s of km’s. Source: Global
Mapping International, Colorado Springs, Colorado, USA. Series name: Global Ministry Map-
ping System. Series issue: Version 3.0
Petroleum: Indicator variable that takes on the value of one if an oil ﬁeld is in the
32historical homeland of an ethnic group and zero otherwise. Source: The Petroleum Dataset
v.1.1 contains information on all known on-shore oil and gas deposits throughout the world.
http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Geographical-and-Resource/Petroleum-Dataset/Petroleum-
Dataset-v11/
Diamond: Indicator variable that takes on the value of one if a diamond mine is in the
historical homeland of an ethnic group and zero otherwise. Source: Map of Diamond Resources.
www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Geographical-and-Resource/Diamond-Resources/
Capital Indicator: Dummy variable that takes on the value one when a capital city
is located in an ethnic historical homeland (in a country for partitioned ethnicities) and zero
otherwise.
Latitude: Latitude of the centroid of each ethnic group. Source: Constructed using
ArcGIS Software.
Longitude: Longitude of the centroid of each ethnic group. Source: Constructed using
ArcGIS Software.
Regional Indicators: There are ﬁve regional indicator variables, North Africa, Western
Africa, Central Africa, Eastern Africa, and Southern Africa. Source: Nunn (2008).
Slavery: Number of persons of each ethnic group that were shipped during the trans-
Atlantic and Indian Ocean slave trades. Following Nunn (2008) in the regressions we use the
log of one plus the number of slaves per 1000 of square kilometers. Source: Nunn (2008) and
Nunn and Wantchekon (2011).
City in 1400: Indicator variable that takes on the value of one if a city with a population
larger than 20,000 in 1400 was in the historical homeland of an ethnic group and zero otherwise.
Source: Chandler (1987).
Distance to Explorer’s Routes: The geodesic distance of the centroid of each group
to the nearest route of the principal European explorers. Source: The "Century Atlas, Africa"
digitized by Nunn (2012).
Settlement Pattern: Ordered variable ranging from 0 to 7 quantifying "settlement pat-
tern of each group". 0 indicates fully nomadic (migratory) groups, 1 indicates semi-nomadic, 2
indicates semi-sedentary, 3 identiﬁes groups that live in compact and impermanent settlements,
4 indicates societies those in neighborhoods of dispersed family homes, 5 indicates for groups
in separated hamlets forming a single community, 6 indicates societies living in compact and
relatively permanent settlements, and 7 denotes the groups residing in complex settlements.
Source: Murdock (1967); variable code in the Ethnographic Atlas v30.
Political Centralization: The binary index is constructed using Murdock’s (1967)
Jurisdictional Hierarchy beyond Local Community 0 − 4 index that indicates the number of
33jurisdictional levels (political complexity) in each society above the local level. The political
centralization index takes the value 0 if the Jurisdictional Hierarchy beyond Local Community
variable equals 0 or 1 (when the society is classiﬁed as either stateless or forming a small chief-
dom). The index takes on the value 1 if the Jurisdictional Hierarchy beyond Local Community
variable equals 2, 3, and 4 (when the society is classiﬁed as being part of large paramount chief-
dom or a large state). This aggregation follows Gennaioli and Rainer (2006, 2007). Source:
Murdock (1967).
Class Stratiﬁcation: Ordered variable ranging from 0 to 4 quantifying "the degree of
class diﬀerentiation, excluding purely political and religious statuses". A zero score indicates
"absence of signiﬁcant class distinctions among freemen, ignoring variations in individual re-
pute achieved through skill, valor, piety, or wisdom." A score of 1 indicates "the presence
of wealth distinctions, based on possession or distribution of property, which however have not
crystallized into distinct and hereditary social classes." A score of 2 indicates "elite stratiﬁcation
in which an elite class derives its superior status from control over scarce resources, particularly
land, and is thereby diﬀerentiated from a propertyless proletariat or serf class". A score of 3
indicates a "dual stratiﬁcation into a hereditary aristocracy and a lower class of ordinary com-
moners or freemen, where traditionally ascribed noble status is at least as decisive as control
over scarce resources. A score of 4 indicates "complex stratiﬁcation into social classes corre-
lated in large measure with extensive diﬀerentiation of occupational statuses." Source: Murdock
(1967); variable code in the Entholinguistic Atlas v67.
Dependence on Agriculture: 0 − 10 scale index reﬂecting the dependence of each
ethnicity in agriculture at the time of colonization. Source: Murdock (1967).
Animal Husbandry: 0−10 scale index reﬂecting the percentage of subsistence coming
from animal husbandry for each ethnicity at the time of colonization. Source: Murdock (1967).
Number of Civil Wars: 0 − 5 index that counts the number of civil wars that have
aﬀected each ethnic homeland over the period 1970−2005. Source: Uppsala Conﬂict Data Pro-
gram (UCDP)/International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) Armed Conﬂict Dataset,
Version 4-2006; and Raleigh, Cunningham, Wilhelmsen, and Gleditsch (2006).
Number of Civil War Zones: 0 − 8 index that counts the number of civil war zones
that have aﬀected each ethnic homeland over the period 1970−2005. Source: Uppsala Conﬂict
Data Program (UCDP)/International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) Armed Conﬂict
Dataset, Version 4-2006; and Raleigh, Cunningham, Wilhelmsen, and Gleditsch (2006).
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mean mean median mean median mean median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All Types of Conflict Events
  all ethnic homelands (N=826) 0.762 52.386 4.000 35.202 4.000 36.584 4.000
  non-partitioned ethnic groups (N=596) 0.732 47.616 3.000 30.495 3.000 30.460 3.000
  partitioned ethnic groups (N=230) 0.839 64.748 13.000 47.872 10.000 52.297 13.000
  difference 0.11 17.13 10.00 17.38 7.00 21.84 10.00
  difference (p-value) (0.00) (0.28) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Battles
  all ethnic homelands (N=826) 0.593 22.645 1.000 16.781 1.000 14.920 1.000
  non-partitioned ethnic groups (N=596) 0.577 19.837 1.000 14.551 1.000 13.074 1.000
  partitioned ethnic groups (N=230) 0.635 29.926 2.500 22.787 2.000 21.123 2.000
  difference 0.06 10.09 1.50 8.24 1.00 8.05 1.00
  difference (p-value) (0.13) (0.20) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Battles with Change in Territory
  all ethnic homelands (N=826) 0.265 2.810 0.000 2.460 0.000 2.096 0.000
  non-partitioned ethnic groups (N=596) 0.227 2.183 0.000 1.752 0.000 1.558 0.000
  partitioned ethnic groups (N=230) 0.365 4.448 0.000 4.355 0.000 3.498 0.000
  difference 0.14 2.26 0.00 2.60 0.00 1.94 0.00
  difference (p-value) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Violence against Civilians
  all ethnic homelands (N=826) 0.608 19.180 1.000 12.196 1.000 12.227 1.000
  non-partitioned ethnic groups (N=596) 0.572 17.648 1.000 10.502 1.000 10.381 1.000
  partitioned ethnic groups (N=230) 0.700 23.157 3.000 16.758 2.000 17.004 3.000
  difference 0.13 5.51 2.00 6.26 1.00 6.62 2.00
  difference (p-value) (0.00) (0.43) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)






Panel A: All Ethnic HomelandsIndicator 
Likelihood
mean mean median mean median mean median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All Types of Conflict Events
  all ethnic homelands (N=413) 0.741 49.660 4.000 38.280 3.000 36.643 4.000
  non-partitioned ethnic groups (N=200) 0.645 32.300 1.000 29.270 1.000 24.704 1.000
  partitioned ethnic groups (N=213) 0.831 65.967 12.000 47.249 10.000 47.957 12.000
  difference 0.19 33.67 11.00 17.98 9.00 23.25 11.00
  difference (p-value) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Battles
  all ethnic homelands (N=413) 0.545 23.194 1.000 18.031 1.000 16.186 1.000
  non-partitioned ethnic groups (N=200) 0.465 15.700 0.000 13.867 0.000 11.402 0.000
  partitioned ethnic groups (N=213) 0.620 30.235 3.000 22.178 2.000 20.724 2.500
  difference 0.15 14.53 3.00 8.31 2.00 9.32 2.50
  difference (p-value) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.17) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Battles with Change in Territory
  all ethnic homelands (N=413) 0.266 3.281 0.000 2.911 0.000 2.496 0.000
  non-partitioned ethnic groups (N=200) 0.170 2.135 0.000 1.633 0.000 1.303 0.000
  partitioned ethnic groups (N=213) 0.357 4.357 0.000 4.183 0.000 3.616 0.000
  difference 0.19 2.22 0.00 2.55 0.00 2.31 0.00
  difference (p-value) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Violent Indcidents
  all ethnic homelands 0.574 17.910 1.000 13.860 1.000 12.616 1.000
  non-partitioned ethnic groups 0.450 11.390 0.000 10.786 0.000 7.525 0.000
  partitioned ethnic groups 0.690 24.033 3.000 16.919 2.000 17.393 3.000
  difference 0.24 12.64 3.00 6.13 2.00 9.87 3.00
  difference (p-value) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
The table reports summary statistics and test of means and medians for the ACLED civil conflict (outcome) variables employed in the 
empirical analysis at the ethnic homeland level. Panel A reports test of means/medians at the full sample. Panel B reports test of 
means/medians across ethnic homelands close to the national border (using as a cutoff the median distance from the centroid of each ethnic 
homeland to the national border; 102 kilometers). Column (1) reports the likelihood that a conflict (all conflict incidents, battles, battles 
resulting in a territorial change, and violence against the civilian population) affects an ethnic homeland. Columns (2)-(3) report the mean 
and the median value for each type of conflict, respectively. Columns (4)-(5) report the mean and the median value for each type of conflict 
excluding ethnic regions where capital cities fall. Columns (6)-(7) report the mean and the median value for each type of conflict excluding 
ethnic regions where the respective variable exceeds the 99th percentile. For each variable the table reports the mean/median value using all 
ethnic homelands, partitioned ethnicities and non-partitioned ethnicities. The table also reports the mean and median difference and the p-
value of mean-median equality between the group of partitioned and non-partitioned ethnicities. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable 
definitions and data sources.
Table 1: Test of Means and Medians for Main Civil Conflict Measures





OutliersSPLIT FRAC SPLIT FRAC SPLIT FRAC SPLIT FRAC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Land Area under Water  0.3219*** 0.0613*** 0.3891*** 0.0683*** 0.3449*** 0.0670*** 0.3352*** 0.0623***
 (0.0955)  (0.0125)  (0.1012)  (0.0117)  (0.0953)  (0.0122)  (0.0998)  (0.0134)
Land Area 0.0869 0.0149* 0.1051* 0.0171** 0.0938 0.0167** 0.0697 0.0131*  
 (0.0567)  (0.0080)  (0.0600)  (0.0086)  (0.0583)  (0.0084)  (0.0542)  (0.0071)
Elevation -0.0623 -0.0209                
 (0.1834)  (0.0293)                
               
St. Dev. Elevation -0.0001 0.0000                
 (0.0006)  (0.0001)                
               
Suitability for Agriculture 0.4494 0.0621                
 (0.3328)  (0.0491)                
               
St. Dev. Suit. Agricult. 0.8556 0.0672                
 (0.7386)  (0.0859)                
Malaria Stability Index 0.1250 0.0292                
 (0.2297)  (0.0409)                
               
Distance to the Coast -0.0001 0.0000                
 (0.0002) (0.0000)                
               
Diamond Mine Indicator 0.1626 0.018
 (0.1802)  (0.0287)
Oil Indicator 0.0081 0.0026
 (0.1696)  (0.0351)
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.050 __ 0.057 __ 0.051 __ 0.051 __
Adjusted R-squared __ 0.082 __ 0.090 __ 0.089 __ 0.083
Observations  826 826 826 826 826 826 826 826
Table 2  - Border Artificiality 
Panel A: Geographical, Ecological and Natural Resources Features
Table 2 - Panel A reports probit marginal effects (in odd-numbered columns) and OLS estimates (in even-numbered columns) associating 
ethnic partitioning with geographical, ecological and natural resource variables. In odd-numbered specifications, the dependent variable is 
an indicator that equals one when at least 10% of the historical ethnic homeland (as portrayed in Murdock’s (1959) Ethnolinguistic map) 
falls to more than one contemporary countries. In even-numbered columns, the dependent variable is a continuous index of ethnic 
partitioning that reflects the probability that a randomly chosen pixel of the historical homeland of an ethnic group falls into a different 
country. All specifications include a set of region fixed effects (constants not reported). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable 
definitions and data sources. Standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for double clustering at the country-dimension and the 
ethno-linguistic family dimension.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.SPLIT FRAC SPLIT FRAC SPLIT FRAC SPLIT FRAC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Land Area under Water  0.3298*** 0.0624*** 0.3210*** 0.0613*** 0.3162*** 0.0605*** 0.2829** 0.0514***
 (0.0957)  (0.0123)  (0.0959)  (0.0124)  (0.0980)  (0.0130)  (0.1183)  (0.0162)
Land Area 0.0835 0.0143* 0.0858 0.0149* 0.0817 0.0142* 0.1569** 0.0252***
 (0.0559)  (0.0079)  (0.0564)  (0.0079)  (0.0571)  (0.0081)  (0.0731)  (0.0090)
Slave Exports 0.0225 0.0033                 
 (0.0244)  (0.0036)                 
                
Major City in 1400AD 0.0547 -0.0042                 
 (0.2080)  (0.0344)                 
                
Distance to Explorer's Routes -0.0004 0.0000                 
 (0.0003) (0.0000)                 
                
Pre-colonial Settlement Patterns 0.0203 0.0038
 (0.0411)  (0.0055)
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.051 __ 0.050 __ 0.053 __ 0.068 __
Adjusted R-squared __ 0.085 __ 0.082 __ 0.085 __ 0.105
Observations  826 826 826 826 826 826 451 451
Table 2 - Panel B reports probit marginal effects (in odd-numbered columns) and OLS estimates (in even-numbered columns) associating 
ethnic partitioning with historical variables. In odd-numbered specifications, the dependent variable is an indicator that equals one when 
at least 10% of the historical ethnic homeland (as portrayed in Murdock’s (1959) Ethnolinguistic map) falls to more than one 
contemporary country. In even-numbered columns, the dependent variable is a continuous index of ethnic partitioning that reflects the 
probability that a randomly chosen pixel of the historical homeland of an ethnic group falls into a different country. All specifications 
include a set of region fixed effects (constants not reported). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. 
Standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for double clustering at the country-dimension and the ethno-linguistic family 
dimension.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 2  - Border Artificiality 
Panel B: Historical FeaturesSPLIT FRAC SPLIT FRAC SPLIT FRAC SPLIT FRAC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Land Area under Water  0.2528** 0.0475*** 0.3372*** 0.0613*** 0.2928** 0.0558*** 0.2612** 0.0508***
 (0.1155)  (0.0159)  (0.1109)  (0.0163)  (0.1176)  (0.0162)  (0.1209)  (0.0158)
Land Area 0.1628** 0.0257*** 0.1727** 0.0238** 0.1677** 0.0254*** 0.1609** 0.0244***
 (0.0721)  (0.0094)  (0.0797)  (0.0097)  (0.0676)  (0.0084)  (0.0681)  (0.0084)
Political Centralization -0.1965 -0.0321
 (0.1354)  (0.0208)
Class Stratification -0.0242 -0.0038                 
 (0.0569)  (0.0069)                 
                
Share of Agriculture 0.0322 0.0048                 
 (0.0297)  (0.0055)                 
                
Animal Husbandry 0.0000 0.0004
 (0.0374)  (0.0056)
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.068 __ 0.085 __ 0.068 __ 0.067 __
adjusted R-squared __ 0.106 __ 0.128 __ 0.107 __ 0.090
Observations  437 437 394 394 487 487 487 487
Table 2  - Border Artificiality 
Panel C: Pre-colonial Ethnic Features
Table 2- Panel C reports probit marginal effects (in odd-numbered columns) and OLS estimates (in even-numbered columns) associating 
ethnic partitioning with pre-colonial ethnic variables (using data from Murdock (1967)). In odd-numbered specifications, the dependent 
variable is an indicator that equals one when at least 10% of the historical ethnic homeland (as portrayed in Murdock’s (1959) 
Ethnolinguistic map) falls to more than one contemporary country. In even-numbered columns, the dependent variable is a continuous 
index of ethnic partitioning that reflects the probability that a randomly chosen pixel of the historical homeland of an ethnic group falls 
into a different country. All specifications include a set of region fixed effects (constants not reported). The Data Appendix gives detailed 
variable definitions and data sources. Standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for double clustering at the country-dimension 
and the ethno-linguistic family dimension. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.Log Land 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
SPLIT (Partitioning) -0.1748 -0.0190 0.0179 0.0001 -0.0091 0.0203 -0.0216 -0.0126 -0.0003
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.1092)  (0.0255)  (0.0369)  (0.0194)  (0.0221)  (0.0324)  (0.0224)  (0.0190)  (0.0097)
adjusted R-squared 0.223 0.255 0.575 0.418 0.640 0.620 0.340 0.187 0.063
Mean Dependent Variable 2.0620 0.2706 0.6168 0.4079 0.7209 0.6042 0.0854 0.0947 0.0270
Observations  1182 1182 1182 1182 1182 1182 1182 1182 1182
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 3: Ethnic Partitioning and Geographic Characteristics within Countries
Dependent variable is: 
Table 3 reports OLS estimates associating various geographical, ecological, and natural resource characteristics with ethnic partitioning within countries. The unit of analysis is an 
ethnic territory in a country (ethnicity-country). SPLIT is an indicator variable that identifies partitioned ethnicities as those with at least 10% of the historical homeland falling into 
more than one contemporary country. All specifications include country fixed effects (constants not reported). The dependent variable in column (1) is the log of a country-
ethnicity’s region surface area; in column (2) is the log of (1 + surface area under water); column (3) is average elevation; in column (4) is an index capturing land's (soil) suitability 
(quality) for agriculture; in column (5) is the average value of a malaria stability index; in columns (6) is the distance of the centroid of each country-ethnic region to the nearest sea 
coast; in column (7) is a binary index that takes on the value of one if a diamond mine is present; in column (8) is a binary index that takes on the value of one if an oil/petroleum 
field is present; and in column (9) a binary index that takes on the value of one if a major city was present before European’s arrival in Africa (in 1400). The Data Appendix gives 
detailed variable definitions and data sources. The table reports in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the country and the ethno-linguistic family dimensions. ***, **, 








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
SPLIT (Partitioning) 0.7590*** 0.7250*** 0.6740*** 0.6207*** 0.7093*** 0.6813*** 0.7076*** 0.7136*** 0.9580*** 0.8492** 0.9430*** 0.8812** 
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.2928)  (0.2735)  (0.2338)  (0.2234)  (0.2150)  (0.2317)  (0.2473)  (0.1798)  (0.2979)  (0.3316)  (0.2970)  (0.3608)
Log Likelihood -3221.79 -3204.03 -3159.39 -3151.76 -3095.09 -2847.00 -1593.4 -1578.59 -1560.3 -1552.09 -1498.35 -1422.98
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations  826 826 826 826 821 779 413 413 413 413 408 393
The table reports Negative Binomial Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates, associating civil conflict incidents with ethnic partitioning at the ethnic homeland level. The 
dependent variable is the total number of civil conflict incidents at each ethnic homeland over the period 1997-2010. SPLIT is an indicator variable that identifies partitioned 
ethnicities as those with at least 10% of the historical homeland falling into more than one contemporary country. The specifications in columns (2)-(6) and (7)-(12) include a set 
of region fixed effects (constants not reported). The set of simple controls includes the log of land area, the log of (1 + land area under water) (lakes, rivers, and other streams), 
and the log of population approximately in 1960. The set of location controls includes the distance of the centroid of each ethnic homeland from the capital, from the sea coast, 
from the national border, and an indicator that takes on the value one if a capital city falls in the historical homeland. The set of geographic controls includes an index of land 
suitability for agriculture, mean elevation, a malaria stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. The specifications in columns (5) and (11) exclude 
ethnic homelands where the dependent variable exceeds the 99th percentile. The specifications in columns (6) and (12) exclude ethnic homelands where capital cities fall. The 
specifications in columns (7)-(12) focus on ethnic areas close to the national border (using as a cutoff the median distance from the centroid of each ethnic homeland to the 
national border; 102 kilometers). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. The table reports in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the 
country and the ethno-linguistic family dimensions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 4: Ethnic Partitioning and Civil Conflict
Cross-Sectional Estimates
All Ethnic Homelands Ethnic Homelands Close to the National Border








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
SPLIT (Partitioning) 0.4929*** 0.4748*** 0.6731*** 0.6185*** 0.6284*** 0.6171*** 1.0208*** 0.8465*** 0.9258*** 0.8502*** 0.8502*** 0.8388***
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.1559)  (0.2073)  (0.1977)  (0.1876)  (0.1876)  (0.1829)  (0.1767)  (0.3061)  (0.3143)  (0.3145)  (0.3140)  (0.3154)
Log Likelihood -3942.45 -3708.6 -3615.94 -3603.19 -3498.16 -3340.02 -1556.06 -1419.28 -1393.15 -1384.94 -1377.37 -1322.22
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations  1182 1182 1182 1182 1170 1139 576 576 576 576 575 565
The table reports Negative Binomial Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates, associating civil conflict incidents with ethnic partitioning at the country-ethnicity homeland level. 
The dependent variable is the total number of civil conflict incidents at each ethnic homeland within a country over the period 1997-2010. SPLIT is an indicator variable that 
identifies partitioned ethnicities as those with at least 10% of the historical homeland falling into more than one contemporary country. The specifications in columns (2)-(6) and 
(7)-(12) include country fixed effects (constants not reported). The specifications in columns (7)-(12) focus on country-ethnicity areas close to the national border (using as a 
cutoff the median distance from the centroid of each ethnicity-country homeland to the national border; 62 kilometers). The specifications in columns (5) and (11) exclude 
country-ethnic homelands where the dependent variable exceeds the 99th percentile. The specifications in columns (6) and (12) exclude country-ethnic homelands where capital 
cities fall. The set of simple controls includes the log of land area, the log of (1 + land area under water) (lakes, rivers, and other streams), and the log of population in 1960. The 
set of location controls includes the distance of the centroid of each country-ethnic homeland from the respective capital, from the sea coast, from the national border, and an 
indicator that takes on the value of one if a capital city falls in the homeland of an ethnic group within a country. The set of geographic controls includes an index of land 
suitability for agriculture, mean elevation, a malaria stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions 
and data sources. The table reports in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the country and the ethno-linguistic family dimensions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 5: Ethnic Partitioning and Civil Conflict
Country-Fixed-Effects Estimates
All Ethnicity-Country Homelands Ethnicity-Country Homelands Close to the National Border













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
SPLIT (Partitioning) 0.6051*** 0.5909*** 0.4943*** 0.5029*** 0.0376* 0.0396* 0.8442*** 0.8500*** 0.8895*** 0.8937*** 0.0507* 0.0502*
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.1420)  (0.1426)  (0.1621)  (0.1743)  (0.0199)  (0.0209)  (0.2510)  (0.2537)  (0.2439)  (0.2488)  (0.0280)  (0.0293)
Log Likelihood -2630.406 -2432.384 -2502.748 -2299.752 __ __ -995.072 -946.214 -938.915 -891.698 __ __
Adjusted R-squared __ __ __ __ 0.455 0.446 __ __ __ __ 0.466 0.457
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations  1182 1139 1182 1139 1182 1139 576 565 576 565 590 565
The table reports Negative Binomial Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates (in columns (1)-(4) and (7)-(10) and linear probability (LS) estimates associating various aspects of civil 
conflict with ethnic partitioning at the country-ethnic homeland level. The dependent variable in columns (1), (2), (7) and (8) is the total number of battles between government 
forces, rebel groups, and militias; the dependent variable in columns (3), (4), (9), and (10) is the number of violent events against civilian populations. The dependent variable in 
columns (5), (6), (11) and (12) is a dummy variable that equals one if a battle resulting in territorial change of control has taken place and zero otherwise. All specifications include 
country fixed effects (constants not reported). The specifications in columns (7)-(12) focus on ethnicity-country areas close to the national border (using as a cutoff the median 
distance from the centroid of each ethnic homeland within a country to the national border; 62 kilometers). The specifications in even-numbered columns exclude country-ethnic 
homelands where capital cities fall. The set of simple controls includes the log of land area, the log of (1 + land area under water) (lakes, rivers, and other streams), and the log of 
population in 1960. The set of location controls includes the distance of the centroid of each country-ethnic homeland from the respective capital, from the sea coast, from the 
national border, and an indicator that takes on the value of one if a capital city falls in the homeland of an ethnic group within a country. The set of geographic controls includes an 
index of land suitability for agriculture, mean elevation, a malaria stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable 
definitions and data sources. The table reports in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the country and the ethno-linguistic family dimensions. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Territorial Change
Table 6: Ethnic Partitioning and Civil Conflict
Country Fixed Effects Estimates with Various Measures of Civil Conflict
All Ethnicity-Country Homelands Ethnicity-Country Homelands Close to the National Border








Outliers All Obs All Obs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
SPLIT (Partitioning) 0.1912** 0.1984** 0.1869** 0.0824*** 0.0993*** 0.3087*** 0.3131*** 0.3281*** 0.0801* 0.1016*  
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.0953)  (0.0916)  (0.0908)  (0.0314)  (0.0336)  (0.1179)  (0.1158)  (0.1197)  (0.0459)  (0.0553)
Adjusted R-squared 0.617 0.593 0.576 0.439 0.447 0.603 0.595 0.574 0.465 0.451
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations  1182 1170 1139 1182 1182 590 575 565 576 576
Table 7: Ethnic Partitioning and Civil Conflict
Sensitity Analysis. OLS Specifications 
All Ethnicity-Country Homelands All Ethnicity-Country Homelands Close to the National Border
The table reports OLS estimates, associating civil conflict incidents with ethnic partitioning at the country-ethnicity level. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) and 
(6)-(9) is the log of one plus the total number of civil conflict incidents in an ethnic region within a country over the period 1997-2010. The dependent variable in columns 
(4) and (8) is a dummy variable that takes on the value of zero if no conflict has taken place during 1997-2010. The dependent variable in columns (5) and (10) is an 
indicator that equals zero if there have been at most two conflict incidents (2 is the median value of all conflict incidents over the 1997-2010) in an ethnicity-country. The 
specifications in columns (6)-(10) focus on country-ethnicity areas close to the national border (using as a cutoff the median distance from the centroid of each ethnicity-
country to the national border; 62 kilometers). The specifications in columns (2) and (7) exclude country-ethnic homelands where the dependent variable exceeds the 99th 
percentile. The specifications in columns (3) and (8) exclude country-ethnic homelands where capital cities fall. All specifications include country fixed effects (constants 
not reported). The set of simple controls includes the log of land area, the log of (1 + land area under water) (lakes, rivers, and other streams), and the log of population in 
1960. The set of location controls includes the distance of the centroid of each country-ethnic homeland from the respective capital, from the sea coast, from the national 
border, and an indicator that takes on the value of one if a capital city falls in the homeland of an ethnic group within a country. The set of geographic controls includes an 
index of land suitability for agriculture, mean elevation, a malaria stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. The Data Appendix gives detailed 
variable definitions and data sources. The table reports in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the country and the ethno-linguistic family dimensions. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
FRAC 0.7463** 0.6824* 0.7422** 0.8122* 0.687 0.8115**
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.3707)  (0.3883)  (0.3724)  (0.4340)  (0.4237)  (0.4337)
SPLIT-ALT 0.4974*** 0.5119*** 0.5178*** 0.8614*** 0.8412*** 0.8612***
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.1621)  (0.1728)  (0.1637)  (0.2377)  (0.2377)  (0.2374)
Log Likelihood -3612.47 -3349.05 -3507.77 -3608.11 -3344.23 -3502.91 -1392.54 -1329.67 -1384.94 -1387.22 -1324.50 -1379.63
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population Density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations  1182 1139 1170 1182 1139 1170 576 565 575 576 565 575
Table 8: Ethnic Partitioning and Civil Conflict
Sensitity Analysis. Alternative Measures of Ethnic Partitioning 
All Ethnicity-Country Homelands All Ethnicity-Country Homelands Close to the Border
The table reports Negative Binomial Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates, associating civil conflict incidents with ethnic partitioning at the country-ethnic homeland level. The 
dependent variable is the total number of civil conflict incidents at each ethnic homeland in each country over the period 1997-2010. FRAC is a continuous measure of ethnic 
partitioning that reflects the probability that a randomly chosen pixel (area) of the historical homeland of an ethnic group falls into a different country. SPLIT-ALT is an indicator 
variable that identifies partitioned ethnicities as those with at least 5% of the historical homeland falling into more than one contemporary country. All specifications include country 
fixed effects (constants not reported). The specifications in columns (7)-(12) focus on country-ethnic areas close to the national border (using as a cutoff the median distance from the 
centroid of each ethnicity-country to the national border; 62 kilometers). The specifications in columns (2), (5), (8) and (11) exclude country-ethnic homelands where the dependent 
variable exceeds the 99th percentile. The specifications in columns (3), (6), (9), and (12) exclude country-ethnic homelands where capital cities fall. The set of simple controls 
includes the log of land area, the log of (1 + land area under water) (lakes, rivers, and other streams), and the log of population in 1960. The set of location controls includes the 
distance of the centroid of each country-ethnic homeland from the respective capital, from the sea coast, from the national border, and an indicator that takes on the value of one if a 
capital city falls in the homeland of an ethnic group within a country. The set of geographic controls includes an index of land suitability for agriculture, mean elevation, a malaria 
stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. The table reports in parentheses double-













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
SPLIT (Partitioning) 0.6298*** 0.6182*** 0.7750** 0.7692** 0.5568*** 0.5562** 0.7434** 0.7200* 0.5354** 0.5110** 0.6207* 0.5770*
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.1923)  (0.1941)  (0.3046)  (0.3068)  (0.2182)  (0.2335)  (0.3792)  (0.3814)  (0.1984)  (0.2074)  (0.3346)  (0.3335)
Log Likelihood -3582 -3317.33 -1354.67 -1293.51 -3467.48 -3209.94 -1279.21 -1219.5 -3451.45 -3195.16 -1269.92 -1210.46
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations  1182 1139 576 565 1182 1139 576 565 1182 1139 576 565
The table reports Negative Binomial Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates, associating civil conflict incidents with ethnic partitioning at the country-ethnic homeland level. The 
dependent variable is the total number of civil conflict incidents in each ethnic homeland in each country over the period 1997-2010. SPLIT is an indicator variable that identifies 
partitioned ethnicities as those with at least 10% of the historical homeland falling into more than one contemporary country. All specifications include country fixed effects 
(constants not reported).  The specifications in columns (3), (4), (7), (8), (11), and (12) focus on areas close to the national border (using as a cutoff the median distance from the 
centroid of each country-ethnic homeland to the national border; 62 kilometers). The specifications in even-numbered columns exclude country-ethnic homelands where capital 
cities fall. The specifications in (1)-(4) and (9)-(12) include a cubic polynomial in latitude and longitude. The specifications in (5)-(12) include a set of ethnic family fixed effects 
(constants not reported). The set of simple controls includes the log of land area, the log of (1 + land area under water) (lakes, rivers, and other streams), and the log of population in 
1960. The set of location controls includes the distance of the centroid of each country-ethnic homeland from the respective capital, from the sea coast, from the national border, and 
an indicator that takes on the value of one if a capital city falls in the homeland of an ethnic group within a country. The set of geographic controls includes an index of land 
suitability for agriculture, mean elevation, a malaria stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and 
data sources. The table reports in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the country and the ethno-linguistic family dimensions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 9A: Ethnic Partitioning and Civil Conflict
Sensitivity Analysis. Accounting for Location
Latitude-Longitude Polynomial Ethnic Family Fixed Effects
Latitude-Longitude Polynomial 





Country Areas Border Areas
All Ethnicity-
Country AreasAll  Border All  Border All  Border All  Border All  Border
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
SPLIT (Partitioning) 0.5593* 0.7990* 0.6595*** 0.8090** 0.5548*** 1.2937*** 0.7961*** 0.8755** 0.4311** 0.4296**
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.3213)  (0.3844)  (0.1183)  (0.3297)  (0.1974)  (0.2514)  (0.1507)  (0.4904)  (0.1371)  (0.2000)
Log Likelihood -3416.154 -1354.598 -3143.062 -1237.219 -2617.48 -894.705 -2558.178 -1026.955 -2635.134 -993.766
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations  1104 554 1040 508 808 350 893 456 883 436
The table reports Negative Binomial Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates, associating civil conflict incidents with ethnic partitioning at the country-ethnic homeland level. The 
dependent variable is the total number of civil conflict incidents in an ethnic homeland within a country over the period 1997-2010. In columns (1)-(2) we exclude ethnicity-
country observations that fall in North Africa. In columns (3)-(4) we exclude observations that fall in South Africa. In columns (5)-(6) exclude observations that fall in West 
Africa. In columns (7)-(8) we exclude observations that fall in East Africa. In column (9)-(10) we exclude observations that fall in Central Africa The regional classification 
follows Nunn (2007). All specifications include country fixed effects (constants not reported). The set of simple controls includes the log of land area, the log of (1 + land area 
under water) (lakes, rivers, and other streams), and the log of population in 1960. The set of location controls includes the distance of the centroid of each country-ethnic homeland 
from the respective capital, from the sea coast, from the national border, and an indicator that takes on the value of one if a capital city falls in the homeland of an ethnic group 
within a country. The set of geographic controls includes an index of land suitability for agriculture, mean elevation, a malaria stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil 
field indicator. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. The table reports in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the country and the 
ethno-linguistic family dimensions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 9B: Ethnic Partitioning and Civil Conflict
Sensitity Analysis. Excluding Each Time a Different African Region
Excluding
North South West East Central(1) (2) (3) (4)
SPLIT - Partitioning 0.2189*** 0.1579*** 0.2434*** 0.1616***
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.0557)  (0.0526)  (0.0615)  (0.0560)
Log Likelihood -846.11 -809.689 -958.417 -907.662
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Polynomial Latitude & Longitude Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnic Family Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No
Country Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Observations  826 822 826 822
The table reports Poisson Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates associating various measures of civil war with ethnic 
partitioning. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) is the number of civil wars that have taken place in the 
historical homeland of an ethnic group between 1970 and 2005. The dependent variable in columns (3)-(4) is the 
number of conflict zones associated with civil wars that have affected the historical homeland of an ethnic group 
during the period 1970-2005. SPLIT is an indicator variable that identifies partitioned ethnicities as those with at least 
10% of the historical homeland belonging to more than one contemporary country. The specifications in odd-
numbered columns include a set of region fixed effects (constants not reported); the specifications in even-numbered 
columns include a set of country fixed effects (constants not reported). The assignment of the country fixed effects is 
based on the centroid of each ethnic homeland.
All specifications include a cubic polynomial in latitude and longitude of the centroid of each ethnic group. All 
specifications include a rich set of conditioning variables, namely log land area, log land area under water (lakes, 
rivers, and other streams), log population around independence, the distance of each ethnic homeland to the national 
border, the distance to the capital city, the distance to the closest sea coast, land suitability for agriculture, mean 
elevation, a malaria stability index, an indicator of early development that equals one when a major city was in the 
ethnicity’s historical homeland in 1400, an oil indicator and a diamond indicator. The Data Appendix gives detailed 
variable definitions and data sources. Standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for double clustering at the 
country-dimension and the ethno-linguistic family dimension. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 10: Ethnic Partitioning and Civil Wars (1970-2005)
PRIO Dataset








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) Excluding 
SPLIT (Partitioning) 0.7170*** 0.4918** 0.4421*** 0.3603*** 0.3383*** 0.3516*** 0.5262*** 0.3525*** 0.3619*** 0.3191*** 0.2672*** 0.3157***
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.1288)  (0.0968)  (0.0836)  (0.0899)  (0.0923)  (0.0905)  (0.1490)  (0.1230)  (0.0967)  (0.0948)  (0.1029)  (0.0961)
Log Likelihood -4850.15 -4489.32 -4414.53 -4365.37 -4149.16 -4022.85 -2338.24 -2081.06 -2061.75 -2040.4 -1970.1 -1904.15
SPLIT (Partitioning) 0.2467*** 0.1496** 0.0747** 0.0903** 0.0803** 0.0856**  0.1729*** 0.0843** 0.0794* 0.1097*** 0.0933** 0.1148***
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.0586)  (0.0664)  (0.0377)  (0.0374)  (0.0334)  (0.0364)  (0.0172)  (0.0390)  (0.0440)  (0.0388)  (0.0397)  (0.0385)
Adjusted R-squared 0.381 0.546 0.597 0.609 0.569 0.54 0.283 0.537 0.587 0.602 0.579 0.542
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations  2405 2405 2405 2405 2379 2353 1202 1202 1202 1202 1194 1182
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Panel A: NB ML Estimates 
Panel B: LS Estimates
Table 11: Ethnic Partitioning and Civil Conflict
Results with Ethnologue's Mapping of Ethnic Groups
All Language-Country Homelands Language-Country Homelands Close to the National Border
All Observations All ObservationsAll types of ethnic conflict 1
Battles 0.8733* 1
Violent events against civilians 0.9049* 0.6068* 1
Battles resulting is change of territory (Indicator) 0.2529* 0.3164* 0.1422* 1
All types of ethnic conflict 1
Battles 0.8268* 1
Violent events against civilians 0.8839* 0.4965* 1
Battles resulting is change of territory (Indicator) 0.2462* 0.3208* 0.1209* 1
Appendix Table 1: Correlation Structure of the Main Dependent Variables
The table reports the correlation structure between all ACLED civil conflict measures. Panel A reports the correlogram at the 
ethnic homeland level (N=826); Panel B reports the correlogram at the country-ethnicity level (N=1182). * indicates 
statistical significance at the 95% confidence level. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources.
Panel A: Ethnic Homeland Level
Panel B: Country-Ethnicity Homeland LevelObs. mean st. dev. min p25 median p75 p99 max
All Civil Conflict Incidents 826 52.39 195.69 0.00 1.00 4.00 34.00 580.00 2916.00
Battles 826 22.65 94.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 13.00 313.00 1608.00
Battles with Territorial Change 826 19.18 96.20 0.00 0.00 1.00 9.00 231.00 2009.00
Violent Events against Civilians 826 0.27 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Population at Independence 826 328,991 1,063,156 57 41,810 118,160 303,659 2,912,382 25,700,000
Land Area 826 34.17 59.18 0.24 6.16 14.48 36.07 286.33 604.90
Land Area under Water  826 0.86 2.26 0.00 0.01 0.17 0.68 10.87 27.66
Catital City Indicator 826 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Distance to the Capital City 826 141.15 126.00 0.00 44.87 102.25 204.98 536.73 636.87
Distance to the Sea Coast 826 499.98 371.34 11.31 255.59 391.81 629.83 1673.47 1846.93
Distance to the National Border 826 597.49 432.10 0.22 208.79 554.35 918.12 1609.77 1721.30
Mean Elevation 826 0.62 0.44 0.00 0.30 0.49 0.94 1.84 2.17
Land Suitability for Agriculture 826 0.41 0.24 0.00 0.26 0.42 0.57 0.93 0.98
Malaria Stability Index 826 0.75 0.36 0.00 0.58 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00
Oil Indicator 826 0.13 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 4.00
Diamond Mine Indicator 826 0.12 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
All Civil Conflict Incidents 1182 33.63 139.63 0.00 0.00 2.00 18.00 438.00 2888.00
Battles 1182 14.54 67.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.00 238.00 1608.00
Battles with Territorial Change 1182 1.94 7.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 100.00
Violent Events against Civilians1182 12.25 72.43 0.00 0.00 1.00 5.00 182.00 2009.00
Population at Independence 1182 222,093   880,884    17     15,528    62,931     186,570    2,143,565    25,600,000   
Land Area 1182 22.41 40.68 0.11 2.81 8.33 23.29 216.23 493.82
Land Area under Water  1182 0.51 1.39 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.40 6.18 21.63
Catital City Indicator 1182 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Distance to the Capital City 1182 0.51 0.36 0.01 0.26 0.41 0.63 1.70 1.88
Distance to the Sea Coast 1182 0.60 0.43 0.00 0.23 0.56 0.93 1.63 1.74
Distance to the National Border 1182 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.16 0.52 0.64
Mean Elevation 1182 0.62 0.44 0.00 0.29 0.49 0.95 1.91 2.18
Land Suitability for Agriculture 1182 0.41 0.24 0.00 0.25 0.42 0.57 0.94 0.98
Malaria Stability Index 1182 0.72 0.34 0.00 0.50 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00
Oil Indicator 1182 0.09 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Diamond Mine Indicator 1182 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Appendix Table 2: Summary Statistics 
The table reports descriptive statistics for all variables employed in the empirical analysis. Panel A reports summary statistics for all control 
variables at the ethnic homelad level. Panel B reports summary statistics for all control variables at the country-ethnicity sample.  The Data 
Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources.
Panel A: Ethnic Homeland Level
Panel B: Country-Ethnic Homeland LevelAdditional Variable Obs. Additional Variable Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gathering 0.0128 487 -0.0682 487
 (0.0524)  (0.0486)
Hunting 0.0415 487 0.0388 487
 (0.0483)  (0.0452)
Fishing 0.0234 487 -0.004 487
 (0.0556)  (0.0518)
Milking -0.0116 452 0.0118 452
 (0.0552)  (0.0377)
Agriculture -0.0109 487 0.0104 487
-0.0108 -0.0102
Alternative Argiculture Dep. -0.0381 452 -0.0231 452
-0.0283 -0.0322
Polygyny -0.0174 478 -0.0051 478
 (0.0453)  (0.0503)
Clan Communities 0.0197 396 0.0385 396
 (0.0609)  (0.0614)
Complex Settlements 0.0209 451 0.017 451
 (0.0607)  (0.0528)
Binary Class Stratification -0.0158 394 -0.0754 394
 (0.0495)  (0.0457)
Jurisdictional Hierarchy  0.0221 440 0.0061 440
 of Local Community -0.0395 -0.0319
Elections -0.0663 344 -0.0542 344
 (0.0822)  (0.0903)
Inheritance Rule for Property -0.0821 374 0.0211 374
 (0.0927)  (0.0898)




 Conditional RelationshipVariable Definitions: 
Gathering: Binary index that indicates the reliance of the economy on "the collection of wild plans and small land fauna." The 
index equals zero when the dependence is between 0% and 5%; the index equals one when dependence is greater than 5% 
dependence. Source: Murdock (1967); variable code in the Ethnographic Atlas v1.
Hunting: Binary index that indicates the intensity in hunting (including trapping and fowling). The index equals zero when the 
dependence is between 0% and 5%; the index equals one when dependence is greater than 5%. Source: Murdock (1967); 
variable code in the Ethnographic Atlas v2.
Fishing: Binary index that indicates the intensity in fishing (including shell fishing and the pursuit of large aquatic animals). The 
index equals zero when the dependence is between 0% and 5%; the index equals one when dependence is greater than 5%. 
Source: Murdock (1967); variable code in the Ethnographic Atlas v3.
Milking: Binary index that equals zero when "domestic animals are milked more often that sporadically" and zero when "little 
or no milking". Source: Murdock (1967); variable code in the Ethnographic Atlas v41.
Agriculture:  0-9 scale index reflecting the intensity of agriculture. "It includes penetration of the soil, planting, tending the 
growing crops, and harvesting but not subsequent food preparation". The index equals 0 when there 0%-5% dependence; 1 
when there is 6%-15% dependence; 2 when there is 16%-25% dependence; 3 when there is 26%-35% dependence; 4 when there 
is 36%-45% dependence; 5 when there is 46%-55% dependence; 6 when there is 56%-65% dependence; 7 when there is 66%-
75% dependence; 8 when there is 76%-85% dependence; and 9 when there is 86%-100% dependence. Source: Murdock (1967); 
variable code in the Ethnographic Atlas v5.
Agriculture Type: 0-4 scale index reflecting the type of agriculture. The index equals 0 when there is "no agriculture"; 1 when 
there is "causal agriculture"; 2 when there is "extensive or shifting agriculture"; 3 when there is "intensive agriculture"; and 4 
when there is "intensive irrigated agriculture." Source: Murdock (1967); variable code in the Ethnographic Atlas v28.
Polygyny: Indicator that equals one when polygyny is practised and zero otherwise. The indicator equals one when the original 
variable indicates that polygyny is common and when large extended families are present. Source: Murdock (1967); variable 
code in the Ethnographic Atlas v8.
Binary Class Stratification:The dummy stratification index equals zero when Murdock's variable equals zero indicating 
"absence of significant class distinctions among freemen, ignoring variations in individual repute achieved through skill, valor, 
piety, or wisdom," and one when Murdock's class stratification measure equals 1, 2, 3, or 4. The construction of this variable 
follows Gennaioli and Rainer (2006, 2007). Source: Murdock (1967); variable code in the Ethnographic Atlas v67.
Clan Communities: Indicator that equals one when Murdock's community marriage organization variable (v15) equals 6 ("clan 
communities or clan barrios") and zero otherwise. Source: Murdock (1967); variable code in the Ethnographic Atlas v15.
Complex Settlements: Indicator that equals one for ethnicities living in compact and relatively permanent settlements (v30=7) or 
in complex settlements (v30=8), and zero otherwise. Source: Murdock (1967); variable code in the Ethnographic Atlas v30.
Jurisdictional Hierarchy of Local Community: Ordered variable ranging from 0 to 2 reflecting the hierarchy of local community 
organization. A zero score indicates the theoretical minimum of two (e.g., family and band), while a score of 2 indicates the 
theoretical maximum of four levels (e.g., nuclear family, extended family, clan barrio, village levels). Source: Murdock (1967); 
variable code in the Ethnographic Atlas v32.
Elections: Indicator that equals 1 when succession to the office of the local headman is conducted via "election or other formal 
consensus, nonhereditary" and zero otherwise. Source: Murdock (1967); variable code in the Ethnographic Atlas v72.
Inheritance Rule for Property: Indicator that equals one when some form of inheritance rule of real property (land) is present; 
the binary indicator equals zero when there is "absence of individual property rights". Source: Murdock (1967); variable code in 
the Ethnographic Atlas v74; the construction of the index follows Fenske (2009).
The table reports OLS (linear probability model) estimates associating ethnic partitioning with pre-colonial ethnic-specific 
variables (using data from Murdock (1967)). In all specifications the dependent variable is an indicator that equals one when at 
least 10% of the historical ethnic homeland (as portrayed in Murdock’s (1959) Ethnolinguistic map) falls to more than one 
contemporary country. Specifications A are simple unconditional models. Specifications B include a set of region fixed effects 
(constants not reported), log land area under water, and log land area. Standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for 
double clustering at the country-dimension and the ethno-linguistic family dimension. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
SPLIT (Partitioning) 0.8545*** 0.8543*** 0.8536*** 0.6579*** 0.7706*** 0.7288*** 0.6687** 0.6884*** 0.7843** 0.5764 0.6919* 0.6408
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.2970)  (0.2516)  (0.2305)  (0.2240)  (0.1991)  (0.2363)  (0.2788)  (0.1984)  (0.3383)  (0.3880)  (0.3456)  (0.4308)
Log Likelihood -2483.17 -2452.05 -2418.24 -2406.04 -2349.76 -2171.71 -1213.03 -1193.44 -1176.18 -1165.08 -1113.3 -1060.28
SPLIT (Partitioning) 0.6025*** 0.5750*** 0.5300** 0.5327** 0.6435*** 0.6119**  0.6184** 0.6389*** 0.9951*** 0.9688*** 1.1552*** 0.9986***
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.2580)  (0.2489)  (0.2592)  (0.2507)  (0.2659)  (0.2549)  (0.2182)  (0.1913)  (0.2818)  (0.3062)  (0.2950)  (0.3186)
Log Likelihood -2342.88 -2316.08 -2296.55 -2294.53 -2241.91 -2049.53 -1159.94 -1144.5 -1137.28 -1133.69 -1081.03 -1030.17
SPLIT (Partitioning) 0.1037** 0.1165*** 0.1181*** 0.1191*** __ 0.1364*** 0.1156** 0.1272*** 0.0905** __ 0.0989** 
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.0490)  (0.0331)  (0.0414)  (0.0374)  (0.0395)  (0.0468)  (0.0390)  (0.0474)  (0.0365)  (0.0398)
Adjusted R-squared 0.091 0.225 0.257 0.278 0.281 0.1 0.199 0.235 0.283 0.282
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations  826 826 826 826 821 779 413 413 413 413 408 393
Panel A: Battles
Panel B: Violence against Civilians
Panel C: Battles that Resulted in a Change of Territory 
Appendix Table 4: Ethnic Partitioning and Alternative Measures of Civil Conflict
Cross-Sectional Estimates
All Ethnic Homelands Ethnic Homelands Close to the National Border
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ABABDA 0.72 EGY 2 LAKA (ADAMAWA) 0.69 TCD 3
ABABDA 0.28 SDN 2 LAKA (ADAMAWA) 0.20 CMR 3
ADELE 0.48 GHA 2 LAKA (ADAMAWA) 0.11 CAF 3
ADELE 0.52 TGO 2 LAMBA 0.39 ZAR 2
AFAR 0.17 DJI 3 LAMBA 0.61 ZMB 2
AFAR 0.22 ERI 3 LAMBYA 0.17 MWI 3
AFAR 0.61 ETH 3 LAMBYA 0.33 TZA 3
ALUR 0.16 ZAR 2 LAMBYA 0.50 ZMB 3
ALUR 0.84 UGA 2 LIGBI, DEGHA (SE) 0.72 GHA 2
AMBA 0.87 ZAR 2 LIGBI, DEGHA (SE) 0.28 CIV 2
AMBA 0.13 UGA 2 LOBI 0.42 CIV 2
AMBO 0.41 AGO 2 LOBI 0.58 BFA 2
AMBO 0.59 NAM 2 LUGBARA 0.45 ZAR 3
AMER 0.56 ERI 2 LUGBARA 0.04 SDN 3
AMER 0.44 SDN 2 LUGBARA 0.51 UGA 3
ANA 0.33 BEN 2 LUNGU 0.31 TZA 2
ANA 0.67 TGO 2 LUNGU 0.69 ZMB 2
ANUAK 0.75 ETH 2 LUVALE 0.81 AGO 3
ANUAK 0.25 SDN 2 LUVALE 0.01 ZAR 3
ANYI 0.42 GHA 2 LUVALE 0.17 ZMB 3
ANYI 0.58 CIV 2 MADI 0.42 SDN 2
ASBEN 0.89 NER 2 MADI 0.58 UGA 2
ASBEN 0.11 DZA 2 MAKONDE 0.56 MOZ 2
ASSINI 0.51 GHA 2 MAKONDE 0.44 TZA 2
ASSINI 0.49 CIV 2 MALINKE 0.03 GMB 6
ATTA 0.51 MAR 2 MALINKE 0.13 CIV 6
ATTA 0.49 DZA 2 MALINKE 0.27 MLI 6
ATYUTI 0.13 GHA 2 MALINKE 0.04 GNB 6
ATYUTI 0.87 TGO 2 MALINKE 0.25 GIN 6
AULLIMINDEN 0.55 MLI 3 MALINKE 0.29 SEN 6
AULLIMINDEN 0.40 NER 3 MAMBILA 0.57 CMR 2
AULLIMINDEN 0.05 DZA 3 MAMBILA 0.43 NGA 2
AUSHI 0.27 ZAR 2 MANDARA 0.35 CMR 2
AUSHI 0.73 ZMB 2 MANDARA 0.65 NGA 2
AVATIME 0.51 GHA 2 MANGA 0.60 NER 2
AVATIME 0.49 TGO 2 MANGA 0.40 NGA 2
AZANDE 0.62 ZAR 3 MANYIKA 0.39 MOZ 2
AZANDE 0.15 CAF 3 MANYIKA 0.61 ZWE 2
AZANDE 0.23 SDN 3 MASAI 0.38 KEN 2
AZJER 0.24 LBY 3 MASAI 0.62 TZA 2
AZJER 0.00 NER 3 MASALIT 0.13 TCD 2
AZJER 0.75 DZA 3 MASALIT 0.87 SDN 2
Appendix Table A:  Partitioned Ethnicities BABUKUR 0.82 ZAR 2 MASHI 0.12 AGO 2
BABUKUR 0.18 SDN 2 MASHI 0.88 ZMB 2
BAJUN 0.37 KEN 2 MASINA 0.82 MLI 3
BAJUN 0.63 SOM 2 MASINA 0.09 BFA 3
BALANTE 0.73 GNB 2 MASINA 0.09 MRT 3
BALANTE 0.27 SEN 2 MATAKAM 0.70 CMR 2
BANYUN 0.48 GNB 2 MATAKAM 0.30 NGA 2
BANYUN 0.52 SEN 2 MBERE 0.02 TCD 3
BANZIRI 0.14 ZAR 2 MBERE 0.24 CMR 3
BANZIRI 0.86 CAF 2 MBERE 0.74 CAF 3
BARABRA 0.31 EGY 2 MBUKUSHU 0.74 AGO 3
BARABRA 0.69 SDN 2 MBUKUSHU 0.15 BWA 3
BARARETTA 0.18 ETH 3 MBUKUSHU 0.12 NAM 3
BARARETTA 0.44 KEN 3 MBUNDA 0.89 AGO 2
BARARETTA 0.38 SOM 3 MBUNDA 0.11 ZMB 2
BARGU 0.77 BEN 4 MENDE 0.18 LBR 3
BARGU 0.03 NER 4 MENDE 0.82 SLE 3
BARGU 0.19 NGA 4 MINIANKA 0.01 CIV 3
BARGU 0.02 BFA 4 MINIANKA 0.72 MLI 3
BASHI 0.09 BDI 3 MINIANKA 0.27 BFA 3
BASHI 0.83 ZAR 3 MOMBERA 0.72 MWI 2
BASHI 0.08 RWA 3 MOMBERA 0.28 ZMB 2
BATA 0.29 CMR 2 MPEZENI 0.11 MWI 2
BATA 0.71 NGA 2 MPEZENI 0.89 ZMB 2
BAYA 0.20 CMR 2 MUNDANG 0.80 TCD 2
BAYA 0.80 CAF 2 MUNDANG 0.20 CMR 2
BERABISH 0.80 MLI 2 MUNDU 0.30 ZAR 2
BERABISH 0.20 MRT 2 MUNDU 0.70 SDN 2
BERTA 0.75 ETH 2 MUSGU 0.76 TCD 2
BERTA 0.25 SDN 2 MUSGU 0.24 CMR 2
BIDEYAT 0.21 LBY 4 NAFANA 0.74 GHA 2
BIDEYAT 0.40 TCD 4 NAFANA 0.26 CIV 2
BIDEYAT 0.03 EGY 4 NALU 0.41 GNB 2
BIDEYAT 0.36 SDN 4 NALU 0.59 GIN 2
BIRIFON 0.52 GHA 3 NAMA 0.18 ZAF 2
BIRIFON 0.47 BFA 3 NAMA 0.82 NAM 2
BOBO 0.20 MLI 2 NAUDEBA 0.87 BEN 2
BOBO 0.80 BFA 2 NAUDEBA 0.13 TGO 2
BOKI 0.22 CMR 2 NDAU 0.86 MOZ 2
BOKI 0.78 NGA 2 NDAU 0.14 ZWE 2
BONDJO 0.14 ZAR 2 NDEMBU 0.26 AGO 3
BONDJO 0.86 COG 2 NDEMBU 0.39 ZAR 3
BONI 0.67 KEN 2 NDEMBU 0.35 ZMB 3
BONI 0.33 SOM 2 NDOGO 0.01 ZAR 3
BORAN 0.46 ETH 2 NDOGO 0.18 CAF 3
BORAN 0.54 KEN 2 NDOGO 0.81 SDN 3
BRONG 0.84 GHA 2 NDUKA 0.23 TCD 2
BRONG 0.16 CIV 2 NDUKA 0.77 CAF 2
BUEM 0.40 GHA 2 NGAMA 0.30 TCD 2BUEM 0.60 TGO 2 NGAMA 0.70 CAF 2
BULOM 0.85 SLE 2 NGERE 0.65 CIV 3
BULOM 0.15 GIN 2 NGERE 0.29 LBR 3
BUSA 0.14 BEN 2 NGERE 0.06 GIN 3
BUSA 0.86 NGA 2 NGUMBA 0.65 CMR 2
BWAKA 0.81 ZAR 3 NGUMBA 0.35 GNQ 2
BWAKA 0.15 CAF 3 NGWAKETSE 0.86 BWA 2
BWAKA 0.04 COG 3 NGWAKETSE 0.14 ZAF 2
CHAGA 0.24 KEN 2 NSENGA 0.15 MOZ 3
CHAGA 0.76 TZA 2 NSENGA 0.78 ZMB 3
CHAKOSSI 0.27 GHA 2 NSENGA 0.06 ZWE 3
CHAKOSSI 0.73 TGO 2 NSUNGLI 0.78 CMR 2
CHEWA 0.34 MWI 3 NSUNGLI 0.22 NGA 2
CHEWA 0.50 MOZ 3 NUKWE 0.44 AGO 4
CHEWA 0.16 ZMB 3 NUKWE 0.24 BWA 4
CHIGA 0.12 RWA 3 NUKWE 0.05 ZMB 4
CHIGA 0.87 UGA 3 NUKWE 0.26 NAM 4
CHOKWE 0.81 AGO 2 NUSAN 0.30 BWA 3
CHOKWE 0.19 ZAR 2 NUSAN 0.37 ZAF 3
COMORIANS 0.82 COM 2 NUSAN 0.33 NAM 3
COMORIANS 0.18 MYT 2 NYAKYUSA 0.12 MWI 2
DAGARI 0.67 GHA 2 NYAKYUSA 0.88 TZA 2
DAGARI 0.33 BFA 2 NYANGIYA 0.17 SDN 2
DARI 0.78 TCD 2 NYANGIYA 0.83 UGA 2
DARI 0.22 CMR 2 NYANJA 0.64 MWI 2
DAZA 0.27 TCD 2 NYANJA 0.36 MOZ 2
DAZA 0.73 NER 2 NYASA 0.05 MWI 3
DELIM 0.55 ESH 2 NYASA 0.68 MOZ 3
DELIM 0.45 MRT 2 NYASA 0.27 TZA 3
DENDI 0.60 BEN 3 NZANKARA 0.14 ZAR 2
DENDI 0.39 NER 3 NZANKARA 0.86 CAF 2
DIALONKE 0.36 MLI 3 PANDE 0.38 CAF 2
DIALONKE 0.58 GIN 3 PANDE 0.62 COG 2
DIALONKE 0.06 SEN 3 POPO 0.72 BEN 2
DIDINGA 0.04 KEN 3 POPO 0.28 TGO 2
DIDINGA 0.89 SDN 3 PUKU 0.31 CMR 3
DIDINGA 0.07 UGA 3 PUKU 0.49 GNQ 3
DIGO 0.62 KEN 2 PUKU 0.19 GAB 3
DIGO 0.38 TZA 2 REGEIBAT 0.34 ESH 2
DIOLA 0.14 GMB 3 REGEIBAT 0.66 MRT 2
DIOLA 0.07 GNB 3 RESHIAT 0.83 ETH 3
DIOLA 0.78 SEN 3 RESHIAT 0.06 KEN 3
DUMA 0.63 GAB 2 RESHIAT 0.11 SDN 3
DUMA 0.37 COG 2 RONGA 0.60 MOZ 3
DZEM 0.74 CMR 3 RONGA 0.35 ZAF 3
DZEM 0.03 GAB 3 RONGA 0.05 SWZ 3
DZEM 0.24 COG 3 RUANDA 0.02 BDI 5
EGBA 0.41 BEN 3 RUANDA 0.06 ZAR 5
EGBA 0.52 NGA 3 RUANDA 0.89 RWA 5EGBA 0.07 TGO 3 RUANDA 0.02 TZA 5
EKOI 0.38 CMR 2 RUANDA 0.02 UGA 5
EKOI 0.62 NGA 2 RUNDI 0.76 BDI 4
ESA 0.03 DJI 3 RUNDI 0.04 RWA 4
ESA 0.52 ETH 3 RUNDI 0.20 TZA 4
ESA 0.44 SOM 3 RUNGA 0.74 TCD 3
EWE 0.44 GHA 2 RUNGA 0.26 CAF 3
EWE 0.56 TGO 2 SABEI 0.56 KEN 2
FANG 0.37 CMR 4 SABEI 0.44 UGA 2
FANG 0.07 GNQ 4 SAHO 0.43 ERI 2
FANG 0.54 GAB 4 SAHO 0.57 ETH 2
FANG 0.02 COG 4 SAMO 0.12 MLI 2
FON 0.86 BEN 3 SAMO 0.88 BFA 2
FON 0.14 TGO 3 SANGA 0.26 CMR 3
FOUTADJALON 0.01 MLI 4 SANGA 0.19 CAF 3
FOUTADJALON 0.11 GNB 4 SANGA 0.55 COG 3
FOUTADJALON 0.88 GIN 4 SEKE 0.34 GNQ 2
FOUTADJALON 0.01 SEN 4 SEKE 0.66 GAB 2
FUNGON 0.81 CMR 2 SHAMBALA 0.10 KEN 2
FUNGON 0.19 NGA 2 SHAMBALA 0.90 TZA 2
GADAMES 0.25 LBY 3 SHEBELLE 0.58 ETH 2
GADAMES 0.27 TUN 3 SHEBELLE 0.42 SOM 2
GADAMES 0.48 DZA 3 SHUWA 0.62 TCD 3
GIL 0.80 MAR 2 SHUWA 0.17 CMR 3
GIL 0.20 DZA 2 SHUWA 0.21 NGA 3
GOMANI 0.86 MWI 2 SONGHAI 0.57 MLI 3
GOMANI 0.14 MOZ 2 SONGHAI 0.36 NER 3
GREBO 0.33 CIV 2 SONGHAI 0.07 BFA 3
GREBO 0.67 LBR 2 SONINKE 0.68 MLI 3
GRUNSHI 0.68 GHA 2 SONINKE 0.03 SEN 3
GRUNSHI 0.32 BFA 2 SONINKE 0.29 MRT 3
GUDE 0.83 CMR 2 SOTHO 0.24 LSO 2
GUDE 0.17 NGA 2 SOTHO 0.76 ZAF 2
GULA 0.61 TCD 2 SUBIA 0.11 BWA 4
GULA 0.39 CAF 2 SUBIA 0.53 ZMB 4
GUN 0.48 BEN 2 SUBIA 0.06 ZWE 4
GUN 0.52 NGA 2 SUBIA 0.30 NAM 4
GURENSI 0.74 GHA 3 SUNDI 0.37 ZAR 2
GURENSI 0.13 TGO 3 SUNDI 0.63 COG 2
GURENSI 0.13 BFA 3 SURI 0.71 ETH 2
GURMA 0.15 BEN 4 SURI 0.29 SDN 2
GURMA 0.12 NER 4 SWAZI 0.45 ZAF 2
GURMA 0.01 TGO 4 SWAZI 0.55 SWZ 2
GURMA 0.72 BFA 4 TABWA 0.57 ZAR 2
GUSII 0.53 KEN 2 TABWA 0.43 ZMB 2
GUSII 0.47 TZA 2 TAJAKANT 0.15 MAR 4
HAMAMA 0.80 TUN 2 TAJAKANT 0.14 ESH 4
HAMAMA 0.20 DZA 2 TAJAKANT 0.66 DZA 4
HAUSA 0.14 NER 2 TAJAKANT 0.05 MRT 4HAUSA 0.86 NGA 2 TAMA 0.30 TCD 2
HIECHWARE 0.81 BWA 2 TAMA 0.70 SDN 2
HIECHWARE 0.19 ZWE 2 TAWARA 0.57 MOZ 2
HLENGWE 0.82 MOZ 3 TAWARA 0.43 ZWE 2
HLENGWE 0.00 ZAF 3 TEDA 0.34 LBY 3
HLENGWE 0.18 ZWE 3 TEDA 0.35 TCD 3
HOLO 0.84 AGO 2 TEDA 0.31 NER 3
HOLO 0.16 ZAR 2 TEKE 0.31 ZAR 3
IBIBIO 0.11 CMR 2 TEKE 0.03 GAB 3
IBIBIO 0.89 NGA 2 TEKE 0.66 COG 3
IFORA 0.30 MLI 2 TEKNA 0.53 MAR 2
IFORA 0.70 DZA 2 TEKNA 0.47 ESH 2
IMRAGEN 0.10 MAR 3 TEM 0.17 BEN 2
IMRAGEN 0.74 ESH 3 TEM 0.83 TGO 2
IMRAGEN 0.16 MRT 3 TENDA 0.57 GIN 2
ISHAAK 0.20 ETH 2 TENDA 0.43 SEN 2
ISHAAK 0.80 SOM 2 THONGA 0.58 MOZ 3
IWA 0.33 TZA 2 THONGA 0.42 ZAF 3
IWA 0.67 ZMB 2 TIENGA 0.22 NER 3
JERID 0.90 TUN 2 TIENGA 0.78 NGA 3
JERID 0.10 DZA 2 TIGON 0.32 CMR 2
JIE 0.24 KEN 2 TIGON 0.68 NGA 2
JIE 0.76 UGA 2 TIGRINYA 0.51 ERI 3
KABRE 0.39 BEN 2 TIGRINYA 0.44 ETH 3
KABRE 0.61 TGO 2 TIGRINYA 0.05 SDN 3
KANEMBU 0.73 TCD 3 TLOKWA 0.14 BWA 3
KANEMBU 0.25 NER 3 TLOKWA 0.77 ZAF 3
KANEMBU 0.02 NGA 3 TLOKWA 0.09 ZWE 3
KAONDE 0.21 ZAR 2 TOMA 0.29 LBR 2
KAONDE 0.79 ZMB 2 TOMA 0.71 GIN 2
KAPSIKI 0.65 CMR 2 TONGA 0.84 ZMB 2
KAPSIKI 0.35 NGA 2 TONGA 0.16 ZWE 2
KARA 0.85 CAF 2 TRIBU 0.25 GHA 2
KARA 0.15 SDN 2 TRIBU 0.75 TGO 2
KARAMOJONG 0.27 KEN 2 TRIPOLITANIANS 0.74 LBY 2
KARAMOJONG 0.73 UGA 2 TRIPOLITANIANS 0.26 TUN 2
KARE 0.75 ZAR 2 TUBURI 0.25 TCD 2
KARE 0.25 CAF 2 TUBURI 0.75 CMR 2
KGATLA 0.13 BWA 2 TUKULOR 0.39 SEN 2
KGATLA 0.87 ZAF 2 TUKULOR 0.61 MRT 2
KISSI 0.12 LBR 3 TUMBUKA 0.74 MWI 2
KISSI 0.02 SLE 3 TUMBUKA 0.26 ZMB 2
KISSI 0.86 GIN 3 TUNISIANS 0.87 TUN 2
KOBA 0.89 BWA 2 TUNISIANS 0.13 DZA 2
KOBA 0.11 NAM 2 UDALAN 0.82 MLI 3
KOMA 0.57 ETH 2 UDALAN 0.05 NER 3
KOMA 0.43 SDN 2 UDALAN 0.13 BFA 3
KOMONO 0.49 CIV 2 VAI 0.76 LBR 2
KOMONO 0.51 BFA 2 VAI 0.24 SLE 2KONGO 0.77 AGO 3 VENDA 0.70 ZAF 2
KONGO 0.23 ZAR 3 VENDA 0.30 ZWE 2
KONJO 0.81 ZAR 2 VILI 0.20 AGO 4
KONJO 0.19 UGA 2 VILI 0.22 ZAR 4
KONKOMBA 0.24 GHA 2 VILI 0.11 GAB 4
KONKOMBA 0.76 TGO 2 VILI 0.47 COG 4
KONO 0.74 SLE 2 WAKURA 0.28 CMR 2
KONO 0.26 GIN 2 WAKURA 0.72 NGA 2
KONYANKE 0.30 CIV 2 WANGA 0.79 KEN 2
KONYANKE 0.70 GIN 2 WANGA 0.21 UGA 2
KORANKO 0.39 SLE 2 WUM 0.88 CMR 2
KORANKO 0.61 GIN 2 WUM 0.12 NGA 2
KOTA 0.41 GAB 2 YAKA 0.16 AGO 2
KOTA 0.59 COG 2 YAKA 0.84 ZAR 2
KOTOKO 0.67 TCD 2 YAKOMA 0.40 ZAR 2
KOTOKO 0.33 CMR 2 YAKOMA 0.60 CAF 2
KPELLE 0.48 LBR 3 YALUNKA 0.25 SLE 2
KPELLE 0.52 GIN 3 YALUNKA 0.75 GIN 2
KRAN 0.16 CIV 2 YAO 0.13 MWI 3
KRAN 0.84 LBR 2 YAO 0.65 MOZ 3
KREISH 0.10 CAF 2 YAO 0.22 TZA 3
KREISH 0.90 SDN 2 YOMBE 0.13 AGO 3
KUNDA 0.84 MOZ 3 YOMBE 0.48 ZAR 3
KUNDA 0.15 ZMB 3 YOMBE 0.39 COG 3
KUNG 0.10 BWA 2 ZAGHAWA 0.14 TCD 2
KUNG 0.90 NAM 2 ZAGHAWA 0.86 SDN 2
KUNTA 0.85 MLI 2 ZEKARA 0.83 MAR 2
KUNTA 0.15 DZA 2 ZEKARA 0.17 DZA 2
KWANGARE 0.84 AGO 2 ZIMBA 0.16 MWI 2
KWANGARE 0.16 NAM 2 ZIMBA 0.84 MOZ 2
Appendix Table A reports the name of partitioned ethnic groups (as coded by Murdock (1959)) and the percentage of the historical 
homeland of the split ethnic groups that fall into more than one country. Section 2.1 gives details on our approach in identifying 
partitioned ethnicities.   